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Preface     
     
The interesting thing about anthropology is that it’s about is telling stories and giving 
people a voice. In popular media, I noticed that a very biased image of women in 
conflict areas exists: an image of women as victims or at best passive bystanders. 
When the Netherlands decided to contribute to MINUSMA, an interesting 
opportunity occurred to explore what the different perspectives of women in a 
recent and relevant conflict are. Like every Master thesis, the writing process has not 
been without setbacks and difficulties: it was doubtful if I could do fieldwork in Mali 
at all. Fortunately, I was able to conduct the fieldwork in the area of Bamako, and I 
found many people willing to share their stories with me. Mali is a country of 
extremes; it is a country of poverty, filth, and recently a country of violence, but it is 
also a country of hospitality and kindness; a country in which even the prime 
minister’s door was open for a chat. I feel lucky that I was able to conduct my 
research on this beautiful country and I hope that I have done the different voices I 
have heard right.      
There are some people I would like to thank: without these people, my 
research would not have been possible. First of all, Cheik: thank you for being my 
translator and my friend. Moussa, thank you for your hospitality and advice in 
Bamako. Mirjam de Bruijn and Daniella Merolla, thank you for your guidance and 
supervision during the writing process. Björn de Heer, thank you for your help, 
humor and for being my internship supervisor at the Ministry of Defense. Fatoumata 
Keita, thank you for all of the information about your research in the North of Mali 
and for the discussions we had. Thanks to my family, friends and boyfriend to 
support me in all of my decisions. And all the women and men I've interviewed in 
Mali as well as in The Hague; thank you for sharing your stories, experiences and 
perspectives with me. Without you, there wouldn’t be any stories to tell.     
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Lorsque tu auras vu    
   
    
Lorsque tu auras vu les mains de ma mère,    
Aussi rugueuses    
Que le tronc du palmier sauvage    
Et ses doigts aveugles par la potasse ;    
    
Lorsque tu auras vu les pieds de ma mère    
Aussi fendus que les rochers barbus du  rivage   
Et ses orteils que minent des vers voraces ;    
    
Lorsque tu auras vu le sourire de ma mère    
Aussi amer qu' un ange qui trépasse    
Et ses lèvres cassées sous les menaces ;    
    
Lorsque tu auras vu les yeux de ma mère    
Aussi beaux que l' âme des sages   
Et la féroce misère qui les pourchasse ; 
    
Lorsque tu auras vu le dos de ma mère 
Et les sentiers qui le partagent, 
    
Et ses seins abattus et ses épaules qui   
s ' affaissent,   
    
Alors tu comprendras pourquoi j'ai cessé   
   de pleurer   
Alors tu comprendras pourquoi j' ai choisi   
    de lutter.   
    
    
    
Albakaye Ousmane Kounta    
Sanglots et dedains recueil de poemes    
Editions Jamana 2003    
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When you have seen    
   
When you have seen my mother’s hands    
As wrinkled as the trunk of the wild palm tree    
And her fingers, became numb by the potassium    
    
When you have seen my mother’s feet    
As cleaved as the cracked rocks in the river   
And her toes, emaciated by greedy worms    
    
When you have seen my mother’s smile    
As filled with grief as a dying angel    
And her lips, which are cleaved by threats    
    
When you have seen my mother’s eyes    
As beautiful as the soul of the wise    
And the cruel poverty that haunts her    
    
When you have seen my mother’s back    
Crooked by the footpaths it has entered    
    
And her weakened and slumped shoulders    
    
   Then you will understand why I stopped  
        crying    
Then you will understand why I have chosen  
       to fight    
    
    
  
Albakaye Ousmane Kounta  
Sanglots et dedains recueil de poemes  
Editions Jamana 2003  
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Introduction     
     
The Malian writer and poet Albakaye Ousmane Kouta read this beautiful and 
personal poem to me, expressing his sympathy for his hardworking and suffering 
mother. It is often said that women suffer disproportionately from poverty, which is 
sometimes referred to as the ‘gender trap’ by international organizations (Amnesty 
International 2009). Also in times of war and conflict, women and girls are 
disproportionally affected (Koch 2008:1). This thesis focusses on the discourses of 
women and conflict in the context of the conflict in Mali in 2012. After the 
occupation of the Northern part of the country by various groups, The United 
Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) was 
established by Security Council on 25 April 2013 to support political processes in that 
country and carry out a number of security-related tasks
1
. What is interesting about 
this mission is that gender plays a prominent role: it is referred to as a ‘gender-
focused’ mission and gender is even called a ‘priority’ (Artikel 100-brief MINUSMA, 
2013:12). However, at the ministry of defense the question was raised how effective 
the gender policies of MINUSMA actually are. The gender policies appear to be quite 
ambitious, while the mission is taking place in a rather complex area. To be able to 
establish whether or not the mission policies are being successful, it is important to 
not only listen to perspectives of policy makers, but to have a holistic view of the 
perspectives all actors involved in the conflict.      
In this thesis I have analyzed whether or not the policies of MINUSMA work 
by analyzing the discourses of the various actors involved in the mission in Mali. I 
have analyzed if the perspectives of the actors involved are in line with the 
perspective that is offered in the policies of MINUSMA. I have distinguished seven 
actors: the United Nations, the Dutch government, the soldiers on the ground, local 
women, local women’s organizations, an independent researcher, and the occupying 
groups. The main question I’ve answered is ‘What are the perspectives that various 
actors involved in the Malian conflict have about the role of gender, women and the 
conflict of 2012, and what do these tell us about the effectiveness of the gender 
policies of MINUSMA?’ To be able to answer this question, I have conducted 
fieldwork at the Ministry of Defense in The Hague, as well as among local women in 
Mali. By studying the narratives about women and conflict of these actors deeply 
involved in the conflict, I was able to gain insight in the differences of their 
discourses. Some actors perceive women as strong individuals, capable of changing 
their social reality, while other actors see women solely in a passive victimized 
manner, not capable of influencing their environment. Therefore I have approached 
this research from an agency/structure point of view: the difficulties and 
opportunities to accomplish social change are linked to an important and ancient 
debate in the social sciences; the structure-agency debate. This debate encompasses 
                                                      
1
 http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minusma/     
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the relationship between actors or agents and social structures, which can be 
bureaucracies, institutions or for example the state (Carlsnaes 1992:246). Supporters 
of ‘structuralism’ claim that human behavior is heavily shaped and influenced by the 
structures around us, while supporters of the ‘agency’ theory refer to the capability 
of individuals to act independently and shape their own social world. In the existing 
literature, the elements associated with agency are choice, reflexivity, transformative 
capacity, and learning, while the factors of structure include material capacities, 
normative structures, and institutions (O’Neill, Balsiger and VanDeveer, 2004:151). 
The suggestion that social change is nearly impossible to achieve, such as Evers 
Rosander (2004) seems to advocate in the case of women in the Malian society 
below , is a structuralist approach, which suggests a victimized, passive and nearly 
unchangeable position of women in the social system. The suggestion that women 
are strong individuals, capable of taking control over their lives, is an agency 
approach.      
Discourses about gender are easily characterized by stereotypical views, or 
the assumption that gender roles are static and unchangeable. This is also the case in 
the context of Mali. Evers Rosander (2004): “In Mali, male domination is presented 
as and lived as a traditional and religious discourse in its own right, which makes 
change and reform policies difficult. Both men and women are ignorant of about 
other alternatives. People think and act as they have learnt since early childhood” 
(Evers Rosander 2004:8). According to Rosander, the segregation of the sexes and 
the adherence to religious or traditional family law are dominant characteristics in 
the society of Mali, as in many other Islamic societies in West Africa. She states that 
women and men need each other for the confirmation of their social identities: 
“Men need women to confirm their role as Muslim husbands and fathers. Women 
need men even more as husbands, legitimate fathers of their children and sources of 
female prestige. For women, professional roles or identities can not outweigh the 
importance of the wife and mother roles as sources of respectability, status and 
prestige” (Evers Rosander 2004:8). These perspectives about the existing gender 
roles and positions in the society seem to suggest a static and victimized position of 
women’s roles in society.      
  However, there is another side of the story; a side in which women are strong 
individuals with the power to make decisions and the ability to influence their 
environment. The same international organization that speaks of a ‘gender trap’, also 
seems to recognize the capacities of women: “When women know they have rights, 
they will claim them despite all the obstacles they face. There are inspiring examples 
to be found throughout the world. Whether acting as human rights defenders or 
simply as members of their families and communities, women drive social progress 
and human rights advancement for all” (Amnesty International 2009).  This reveals a 
stronger position of women in society, one in which women stand up and take 
control over the situation. This perspective offers a more flexible and more engaged 
position of women.     
9     
     
It is not surprising that MINUSMA takes gender into account in international 
missions; there is a strong link between gender and warfare. Sexual violence is often 
perpetrated against men as well, but sexual violence against women is very common 
in conflict situations. “Rape appears to be an all-too-common weapon in war aimed 
at humiliating the enemy, and it’s seldom a random activity but rather a planned 
strategy of warfare” (Koch 2008:2). However, it is important to keep in mind that 
especially in times of conflict the position of women as victims is only one side of the 
picture. Several scholars have demonstrated in analyzing for example the Somali-
Ethiopian war that women are often influential actors in a conflict situation. Their 
roles can vary from combative or supportive ones to roles in the reconciliation 
processes. It is clear that many different perspectives about the roles of women 
exist.     
This thesis will focus on the discourses on women and conflict in the context 
of the recent conflict in Northern Mali. The thesis is structured in the following way: 
first I will provide a theoretical outline about gender and conflict, in which I will focus 
on the link between gender and war, and the various roles women can play 
according to the existing literature. Secondly I will explain the historical, geographical 
and social context of Mali; this will consist of a description of the region and an 
overview of what is written about gender in the area, followed by a historical outline 
of the events leading up to the occupation and political crisis of 2012. In the third 
chapter the research methods will be presented, with the explanation of how they 
contributed to the gathering of information. In the fourth chapter I will present the 
seven discourses of the actors involved in the conflict. In the fifth and final chapter 
the conclusions of the research will be presented.     
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Gender & Conflict     
     
Gender, war, peace and militarism seem to be very interrelated. The initial debate 
about gender and conflict was dominated by the persistent believe in the universal 
image of men as warriors and women as peacekeepers (Nagel 2003).  Although some 
scholars still believe that biological differences cause men to be violent and more 
likely to be engaged in warfare, while women supposed to be biologically peaceful, 
most scholars nowadays abandoned these assumptions. Some scholars however, still 
hold on to the idea that women are naturally more peaceful than men. Isike and 
Uzodike (2011) believe that women have the required personality characteristics 
that are necessary for good governance and peacebuilding; “Women’s peace agency 
is rooted in the values of their womanhood and an ethic of care that values 
relationships, inter-connectedness and empowerment from which springs forth 
empathy, co-operation, tolerance and love. These values are necessary requirements 
for amicably resolving conflict and for sustaining peace” (Isike and Uzodike 2011:55). 
Most of the scholars actually abandoned these points of view, in which women are 
seen as more peaceful and men are seen as naturally more aggressive. Goldstein 
(2001), concluded that “‘minor biological differences’ in combination with ‘cultural 
molding of thought, brave men who feminize their enemies to encode domination 
[…] best explain men’s near monopoly on organized violence, although neither factor 
is sufficient alone” (Moran 2010:263). When feminist theories became important in 
the discipline, gender became defined as a more fluid, variable factor. It became 
clear that especially in cases of extreme violence and disturbance of the social order, 
gender ideologies and relationships between men and women can change. Moran 
(2010) explains that “rather than institutionalizing static, biologically determined 
patterns of behavior, militarization can promote rapid shifts in the way men and 
women behave towards each other, the work they do, and what they expect of each 
other and of themselves” (Moran 2010: 263).      
   Despite the realization that gender relations are not fixed, biological entities, but 
actually are fluent and flexible, and can change in times of disruption and upheaval, 
one must also realize that wars are in fact gendered. Women and men experience 
conflict in a different way; where men are mostly affected by (involuntary) 
participating in violent conflict, it is often said that women’s bodies become 
battlefields themselves in war: women and girls often face “extreme sexual violence, 
abductions, forced marriage and impregnation and slavery” (Arostegui 2013:535).  A 
deeper analysis about sexual violence in warfare is provided in the next paragraph.    
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Sexual violence in warfare     
     
Gender in relation to warfare is a complex issue. Richters (2001) claims gender 
violence should not be limited to physical violence. Gender violence does not only 
include physical injury, but also sexual and psychological abuse, of which the latter is 
considered as the most painful by women (Richters 2001:139).  One can add 
economical violence as a fourth form; forcing women out of their houses, 
economically disempowerment, or preventing a woman from working (Richters 
2001:139-140). There is no uncontested definition of gender violence, but according 
to Richters gender violence is almost an universal phenomenon and one can speak of 
gender violence when violence is directed against a woman because of her sex, or 
affects women disproportionally (Richters 2001:140). According to the Declaration 
on the Elimination of Violence against Women, adopted by the United Nations 
General Assembly in 1993, gender violence encompasses (but is not limited to) the 
following:  a) physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring in the family, b) 
Physical, sexual and psychological violence in the community, c) physical, sexual and 
psychological violence perpetrated or condoned by the state (Richters 2001:141).      
War rape is a distinctive form of sexual violence. It should not be considered 
as an action of one individual to another, but as a more complex phenomenon; as a 
social action (Richters 2001:142). The victim as well as the perpetrator consider 
themselves as part of bigger entities, as part of social, ethnical or national groups. An 
act of sexual violence on women is therefore not used as a regulation of power 
between the sexes, but as a regulation of power between the different groups. 
According to many scholars (Nagel 2003 ; Brownmiller 1975) sexual violence and 
exploitation can be considered as important weapons of war, with rape being the 
most commonly conducted form. Susan Brownmiller has documented cases of rape 
and especially gang rape in war, and concluded that rape in warfare functions as 
both a reward as well as a weapon; raping local women is an act of war for the 
troops to enjoy, and rape is also a technique designed to dominate and humiliate 
enemy men by sexually conquering their women (Nagel 2003: 181). Rape in war is 
therefore an ethnosexual phenomenon, and the military front can be considered as 
an ethnosexual frontier. Enemy groups often differ in nationality, race or ethnicity, 
and a process of othering occurs, in which the differences between the own group 
and the enemy are created and emphasized. Nagel (2003) claims  “The logic of rape 
in war is always the same: rapes are committed across ethnosexual boundaries, and 
rape is used by both sides for the familiar time-honored reasons – to reward the 
troops, to terrorize and humiliate the enemy, and as a means of creating solidarity 
and protection through mutual guilt among small groups of soldiers. Ethnic loyalty 
and ethnic loathing join hands in rape in war” (Nagel 2003: 183). Hidden links 
between war and manhood illustrate sexual assumptions and stereotypes about the 
own group and the enemy population: ‘Real men’ fight wars, enemy men are often 
illustrated as rapists, and ‘hypo-, homo-, or hypersexualised’ (Nagel 2003:30). The 
12     
own women are seen as pure, while the enemy women are illustrated as sluts. These 
processes of othering and stereotyping ensure loyalty to the own group: “Differences 
in nationality, race, or ethnicity separate the combatants and identify the targets of 
aggression in military operations. Whether violence in war is from combat or sexual 
attack, and whether it is guns or bodies that are used as weapons, those who are 
physically or sexually assaulted almost always are different in some ethnic way. Men 
at war do not, as a rule, rape their ‘own’ women unless, of course, those women are 
suspected of disloyalty or ‘collaboration’ (Nagel 2003: 181).     
Even though women are often victim of (sexual) violence in warfare, it is 
important to keep in mind that women can also take upon other roles in times of 
war. As has been said, most scholars nowadays realize gender identities are not 
fixed, and that women and men cannot easily be divided in aggressive/peaceful or 
perpetrators/victims.  But this idea has not gotten through to all policy makers. 
Reading through the great amount of literature about gender and conflict, it seems 
like gender is getting more and more difficult to ignore; the United Nations Security 
Council 1325 encourages the representation of women at all decision-making levels 
and mechanisms for the prevention, management and resolution of a conflict 
(Moran 2010:262). The problem is not that there is a lack of attention on the subject. 
“On the contrary: many NGOs, researchers, and governments do pay attention to 
women in conflicts. However, they work on issues such as gender based violence, 
women as mothers, widows, and nurses: issues that perpetuate classic Western 
gender roles. When the involvement of women in conflict is recognized, they are 
seen as either victims or agents of peace” (Van Hauwermeiren 2012:14). Policy 
makers seem to be highly influenced by the image of women based on the ideas of a 
biological difference between women and men.  Women are very often considered 
victims, or at best passive actors in a conflict. They are seldom seen as full-fledged, 
active participants in a war. This assumption is based on the ideal of women as 
caretakers and men as protectors (Van Hauwermeiren 2012:10). According to 
Arostegui (2013) situations of struggle and conflict can also offer the opportunity to 
bring about change for women. It is in post-conflict situations that society is 
reshaped and the rules are rewritten. It is therefore in this period that women’s 
rights can be advanced. There are several conflicts in which the society was 
reshaped, and women were able to take on non-traditional roles.  Examples of these 
non-traditional roles women are able to take on are given in the section below.    
Without ignoring the fact that women can be victims in times of warfare, this 
thesis will focus on the multiple roles women take on; actors as well as victims, 
sufferers as well as perpetrators. Analyzing the literature about women in warfare, it 
becomes clear that women’s participation in warfare is actually widely acknowledged 
in the discipline.  Girls were part of combat forces in 55 countries and involved in 
armed conflict in 38 of them; “For instance, female combatants have been active in 
Algeria, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal,  
Nicaragua, South Africa, Sri Lanka, and Zimbabwe” (Bouta, Frerks & Bannon 
2005:11). The active participation in conflict is not limited to combat roles, but can 
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also be supportive, such as cook, administrator or partner. Women in fighting forces 
tend to play three different roles, according to Bouta, Frerks and Bannon; 
combatant, supporter and dependent (Bouta, Frerks & Bannon 2005:13). Generally 
women are one-tenth to one-third of the combatants in conflicts (Bouta, Frerks & 
Bannon 2005:11).      
There are many wars in which women had multiple roles. Van Hauwermeiren 
(2012) has analyzed the roles of women in the The Ogaden war or Somali-Ethiopian 
war (July 1977 – March 1978) and discovered that women had many different roles 
to play. In the Western Somali Liberation Front, women were nurses and fighters, 
and sometimes they had very powerful positions. They were also very important for 
the morale of the force; by performing and dancing for the troops in the so-called 
danta, music events. However, they were also victims; they were wounded and 
killed, and sometimes raped (Van Hauwermeiren 2012).      
Arestegui (2013) analyzed how women in Rwanda and Uganda have used 
opportunities during crises to bring about positive change in their countries. Both of 
these countries have established strong legal and policy frameworks around gender 
equality and women’s rights. Women’s advocacy has been critical in the creation of 
this (Arostegui 2013:539). After the genocide of 1994 in Rwanda, the population was 
strongly impoverished and women were the majority of the population. The 
Rwandan women became the breadwinners of the country, and began to organize 
themselves in groups and organizations to share ideas, and to take action to advance 
their interests and needs; they have played a lobbying role for the improvement of 
laws in their interest, such as laws about property rights and gender-based violence. 
As a result, Rwanda has the highest percentage of women in Parliament with 56% in 
2013, and the constitution incorporates important principles of equality. The 
increased economic power of women has had a positive impact on the gender 
equality (Arostegui 2013: 540-541).      
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Gender in post-conflict countries     
     
Especially the post-conflict situation is an important period in which inclusive and 
lasting peace can be build. According to Arestogui (2013), this requires the full and 
equal participation of all parts of society (Arestogui 2013: 536). She states that the 
awareness of the importance to include women in peace and security processes is 
increasing: “Women are half the global population and a critical part of society, and 
without them real and sustainable peace cannot be achieved. They are not merely 
victims of conflict; they also play active roles as combatants, peace-builders, 
politicians, and activists, and are often in the strongest position to bring about peace 
in their communities. Yet their participation in these processes remain limited – 
particularly in formal processes” (Arestogui 2013: 535). Even though we have seen in 
Rwanda that women can play an important role in the rebuilding of a country, 
women are rarely invited to the peace-negotiation table. Literature illustrates that 
women as well as men can be civilians, combatants, actors and victims. While war 
can be considered as ‘gendered’ and men and women are affected differently by 
conflict situations, it becomes clear that women play multiple roles in times of war; 
victim of sexual violence, as well as breadwinner and provider of her family, 
combatant in the conflict as well as politician in the society. Regarding peace 
negotiations, less than eight percent of the participants are in fact women. And even 
less than three percent of the signators are women (UN Women). According to 
Puechguirbal (2012) this is because the international community is framing women 
in gender roles that enforce stereotypes and inequalities; “Women are sidelined in 
peace talks and negotiations because of a strict division of labor that reassigns 
traditional roles and responsibilities to women and men in the reconstruction 
process. Time and time again, women are labelled victims and put in the category 
vulnerable people together with children, irrespective of the increasing 
responsibilities they take over in the absence of men.”     
 Looking at the existing literature about gender and warfare, it is interesting 
to apply this to the case of this research, which is the military mission in Mali. As I 
mentioned before, various researchers such as Van Hauwermeiren (2012) and 
Arestogui (2013) show that the roles of women and men cannot easily be divided in 
aggressive/ peaceful or perpetrators/victims; women can be victims; wounded, 
killed, and sometimes raped, but women can have very influential roles in a conflict 
as well, as peacekeepers or perpetrators. It is clear however, that the image of the 
woman as victim is the dominant perspective in the current international policies. 
Various researchers such as Puechguirbal (2012) show that women are often seen as 
passive actors or victims, and sidelined in the creation of a solution of a conflict. By 
labelling women as victims, and sidelining them in the decision-making process, fifty 
percent of the voices of the local population aren’t heard: voices that can have 
important interpretations or understandings of the conflict, voices that can help 
solving the conflict or worsen it, and voices that can resist or accept international 
15     
     
policies. We understand that MINUSMA wants to conduct the mission as effective as 
possible, therefore it is necessary to have a holistic overview of the perspectives of 
all actors involved in the mission: not only for getting acceptance and popular 
support of the population, but also for having a correct understanding of the mission 
area, and for being able to adapt the policies to the local situation. Various actors are 
involved in the conflict and the military mission in Mali; the policy-makers in The 
Hague, the Dutch soldiers on the ground, the women in Mali, and the local NGO’s in 
Mali. When linking the case of MINUSMA to the existing literature about gender and 
conflict, questions that would be raised are: What are the gender policies of 
MINUSMA, and on what underlying perspective about women are these policies 
based? Are women seen as passive victims or influential actors? What are the 
perspectives that various actors involved in the Malian conflict have about the role of 
gender, women and the conflict of 2012?  Before I focus on the research methods 
that are used to answer the question, it is important to have a closer look at the 
country in which the conflict takes place.      
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Mali, a country of mobility     
     
Mali is a landlocked country in West-Africa, characterized by the presence of various 
ethnic groups: Bambara, Malinke and Soninke (Mande) form about 50% of the 
population. Other ethnic groups are Peul (17%), Senoufo (9%) Songhai (6%), Touareg 
(6%), and yet many others (12%) (Bakker 2009:7). Looking at the literature about the 
various groups, especially in the central and northern part of Mali, it appears that 
‘mobility’ is a central theme concerning the groups in this area, as well as in other 
parts of the Sahara-Sahel region. The region is ever-changing and complex, and 
therefore the different populations are quite hard to put into statistics. As De Bruijn, 
van Dijk & Van Dijk (2001) state about the Fulbe: “After the drought of the 1980s a 
new network of Fulbe developed extending far into south Mali and over the border 
into Burkina Faso and Cote d’Ivoire, a web of people. Most of these people disappear 
administratively. They are invisible for the Malian government and do not appear in 
statistics” (De Bruijn et al 2001:72). The complex nature of certain areas in this 
region is seen in the description of the Hayre in central Mali by De Bruijn, Van Dijk 
and Van Dijk (2001): “When viewed from afar, the region appears to portray a 
picture of continuous movement of people and animals and the constant 
replacement of fields. With increases in political centralization, the character of 
movements changed. Some lines moved out of the area, others have come in. Some 
move faster than others, some lines split up, disperse or even vanish. Others are 
recreated every year, yet more are created only once, some are circular, others go 
back and forth to the place of origin” (De Bruijn et al 2001:69).      
A dichotomy of nomads and sedentary people would be too simplistic and 
empirically unsustainable (Boesen et al 2014: 1-2). Especially since the past decennia 
there seems to have been a shift in the relationship between mobility and 
settlement, in which nomadic pastoral populations in northern Mali are becoming 
more and more sedentary. Grémont (2014) distinguishes various circumstances 
which are at the cause of this development. The first period of the settlement 
processes starts in the 1970s, in which villages were created as a consequence of 
water deficits which complicated the pastoral activities. The second period was 
driven by NGOs; to have access to the developments projects, the people had to be 
visible and accessible, which led to the creation of settlements. Finally, in the 
nineties a period of claims and rivalries between neighboring groups led to the 
creation of villages as a means of expression, empowerment and legitimacy over a 
territory (Grémont 2014:34). At the same time however, in some social groups, such 
as the Tuareg, Arabs or Fulani, the spatial mobility has expanded since the 1980s. 
This enlargement of the area of mobility is the case for (temporary) migrants, 
merchants and traffickers as well as fighters or members of Islamist groups (Grémont 
2014:33). In the paragraph ‘History of the Conflict’ a more detailed history of the 
Tuareg is presented.     
The reasons for movement in the area are divers. Some have to do with 
ecological reasons, others with employment or adventure. “Reflections on these 
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movements of the people indicate that all have different reasons for being mobile 
but for most, movement is the natural thing to do. It is embedded in their social 
organization and forms part of their Sahelian identity” (De Bruijn et al 2001:69). Even 
though internally mobility is seen as a culture, lifestyle and even part of a group 
identity, the way migration is often approached in literature  shows that “migration 
is often considered to be a problem – or part of a problem – and an anomaly instead 
of a “normal” social pattern (Boesen et al 2014:2). Benjaminsen and Ba (2009) even 
state that pastoralism was looked upon as an obstacle to development (Benjaminsen 
& Ba 2009:74). The pastoral groups have gradually lost power and wealth to the 
benefits of sedentary groups (Benjaminsen & Ba 2009:79). However, Fall (1999) 
concludes after fieldwork in Mali, Guinae and Senegal, that Fulbe women still prefer 
the “security of the insecure life of the pastoralist” (Fall 1999:193). She explains that 
even though life has become more difficult for pastoralist groups, these difficulties 
are lived and shared by the group as a whole.      
     
Gender relations in the region     
Looking at what the existing literature reveals about gender relations within the 
various groups in Mali, it becomes clear that agency, structure, vulnerability and 
power are central themes concerning this area. Traditionally, women were placed in 
a victimized position in the literature, such as Fall (1999) concludes about the Fulbe, 
people in the Sahel and savannah zones of West Africa: “Fulbe women, like other 
African women and other communities in the ‘third world’ have been traditionally 
perceived in the anthropological literature as oppressed, repressed, and otherwise 
exploited. More recent literature had begun to examine women’s lives from a 
different perspective, as decision makers in their societies who make choices and 
negotiate” (Fall 1999:175). In this section, literature about gender relations in various 
groups in the region of Mali is explored, to see what discourses exist about gender, 
mobility and power relations in the region.     
That movements and migration have to do with power relations and identity 
construction becomes clear when looking at the differences between male and 
female migrants, as Grosz-Ngaté has done after long-term research in the area of 
Sana, in the Ségou region of Mali. The migration of young men is common and widely 
accepted, and even perceived as a necessity rather than a choice (Grosz-Ngaté 
2000:91). However, labor migration of girls led to a great deal of discussion and fear: 
“[T]he autonomy young women gain is perceived as a risk and a potential threat to 
the integrity of the collectivity. Girls’ travel to and work in the city helps constitute 
them as independent agents and undermines kin-based power and the very 
conception of the household. The discourse on female morality and the efforts to 
keep girls from leaving for the city signal the ambivalence over this process” (Grosz-
Ngaté 2000:98). Looking at this ambivalence, it appears that the migration of men is 
associated with economic rewards for the household, while the migration of women 
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is associated with a decline in morality. Men are perceived as responsible for the 
household, while women are seen as responsible for the wider community (Grosz-
Ngaté 2000:99). The migration of girls is seen a potential dangerous for the 
community, restraining them in their choices.     
 Djoudi and Brockhaus (2011) also noted that men are more often involved in 
migrating than women in the Lake Faguibine area in Northern Mali. They see 
migrating as a strategy to cope with ecological changes. In the discourse about 
climate change, there is a strong link between gender, poverty and vulnerability, in 
which poverty is being linked to women (Djoudi & Brockhaus 2011:125). “Women 
and other socially marginalized groups are likely to be most vulnerable to climate 
change because of the socially and politically driven lack of participation in decision 
making and access to power” (Djoudi & Brockhaus 2011:126). Migration is presented 
as one of the most important coping strategies for men, forcing women to undertake 
‘male’ activities, without acquiring the same rights (Djoudi & Brockhaus 2011:133). 
This discourse reduces women to being vulnerable. However, Djoudi and Brockhaus 
call for a reconsidering of the existing classifications and see opportunities in the 
changing circumstances: “The most important question is the how the women’s new 
roles and responsibilities affect and change power relations. We argue that emerging 
new societal roles could empower women to negotiate new institutional 
arrangements to access and control resources” (Djoudi & Brockhaus 2011:133). Even 
though women are being victimized and linked to poverty and vulnerability, they are 
also seen as potential agents of change.      
Historically, women also found themselves balancing between exercising 
agency and coping with structures imposed by their environment, as can be seen in 
the research of Mathee (2011) about women’s agency in marriages. For this research 
he analyzed fatwas from Timbuktu during the colonial era. Fatwas are legal tools 
declared by religious jurist-consults to deal with incidents and questions for which no 
ready-made answers in Islamic law exists (Mathee 2011:78). “Fatwas tell us 
something about what ordinary persons said or did in addition to the jurist’s view. 
They allow us to engage with the question of Muslim wives’ agency within the 
marriage in particular and Islamic law in general” (Mathee 2011:79). Mathee (2011) 
states that a negative image of women existed; they were regarded as ignorant and 
impious. However, analyzing the fatwas, it appears that  the women in fact knew the 
Islamic law, manipulated it, and even used the negative image men had of them to 
their advantage (Mathee 2011:86). Without challenging the law or the other 
structures imposed on them, they were able to express themselves and influence 
their environment. “Not only do we find wives have a voice seen murkily through the 
words of the mufti, but they also turn out to be knowledgeable of Islamic law. They 
understand Islamic law, manipulate it and act accordingly. In short, what they say 
and do indicates agency” (Mathee 2011:95).     
According to Bakker (2009) Malian societies are strongly dominated by men:   
domestic violence is not unusual, and polygamy still is very popular (Bakker 2009:82). 
However, it is clear that gender relations vary per society, social and ethnic group, 
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and probably even per household. According to Fall (1999) Fulbe women feel like 
they enjoy certain liberties and status that are not as apparent in non-Fulbe, 
sedentary groups (Fall 1999:193). “They have often talked of leaving their husbands, 
or of leaving their mother’s or father’s camp, but not of leaving the Fulbe way of live. 
[…] Further, they do not see taking on the characteristics of women of more 
sedentary groups and other ethnicities as desirable. Rather, they would find that an 
unattractive, if not silly, goal […] Interestingly, among intellectual women of Fulbe 
origin whom I have had the good fortune to meet, it is almost unanimously observed 
that on the whole, Fulbe women from pastoral communities are better off than their 
counterparts in other communities” (Fall 1999:192). Also among the Tuareg, women 
appear to have a higher status than other societies; the gender relations in Tuareg 
societies know a relative freedom, often seen as unique to Tuareg culture. For 
example, in this culture, it is the men who veil their faces instead of the women, 
often to the great surprise of Arabs as well as Europeans (Lecocq 2002:14). It is also 
the woman who receives a dowry at the wedding; a tent, her new home, and 
animals, depending on what the family can afford.  The tent and animals are 
considered her property, and the husband comes to live in her family camp. It is also 
possible for Tuareg women to divorce from their husbands: “Divorce is considered 
normal if not usual. And the wife keeps the couple’s possessions – the husband may 
find himself walking away with just his camel. He returns to live at his mother’s 
camp” (Butler 2015).     
 It is clear that Mali and its surrounding area is an ever-changing and complex 
region. It is home to various ethnic and social groups, with their own cultures, 
lifestyles and identities. In these societies, women are balancing between the 
structures imposed by their environment and their desire and ability to make their 
own choices, hereby finding ways to express themselves and to influence their 
environment. The coexistence of the various groups in Northern Mali plays an 
important role in the conflict of 2012. To get a better understanding of this conflict, a 
history of the conflict is presented in the nest section.     
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History of the conflict     
     
Even though Mali was often seen as a shining example of a well-functioning 
democracy in West Africa, there has been a long past of conflicts in the country. 
Francis (2013) states that Mali, often seen as the ‘donor darling of the West’ actually 
was “nothing more than a superficial democracy and a fragile state that was unable 
to address its fundamental political, governance, security and sociodevelopment 
challenges” (Francis 2013:4). In the years after independence, the government’s 
efforts in the nation-building processes were concentrated in the capital cities, 
resulting in feelings of exclusion in other regions and groups (Zounmenou 2013:168).  
In 1963, not long after independence, the first Tuareg revolt took place against the 
new government. There are various reasons for the Tuareg rebellions: communities 
in the North of the country felt an absence of the state, because the political and 
economic activities are concentrated in the Southern part of the country. Ethnicity 
also plays part: in the North there is a discourse that distinguishes between "white" 
Tuareg and Arabs, and “black African” Songhay and other communities in the North. 
“After independence, competing racial nationalisms emerged from roots that went 
much further back in time and which made exclusive claims. Tuareg nationalism 
expressed itself in two rebellions against the Malian state between 1963 and 1964, 
and again between 1990 and 1996” (Lecocq et al. 2013:2). The state put down the 
first rebellion very brutally, thereby penalizing Arabs as well as Tuareg, without 
considering the fact that actually few of them participated in the rebellions. 
According to Zounmenou (2013), this left a legacy that still affects the lack of 
confidence that the Tuareg have in state institutions and government authorities 
(Zounmenou 2013:168). This means that the current attitudes and incentives can be 
understood by looking at the historical developments in the political landscape in the 
country.       
The government also repressed the rebellions of 1990. In this rebellion, 
almost all Tuareg clans were included. (Pezard & Shurkin 2013:8). This unity did not 
last for long, and the groups splintered into a number of factions. The fragmentation 
of the Tuareg rebels did not only reveal a lack of a common front among the rebels, 
but it also made the peace processes more complicated. Between 1991 and 2006 
several peace agreements were signed (Zounmenou 2013:168). With the 
Tamanrassat Accord in 1991, Algeria tried to ensure peace, but the violence 
continued. The National Pact of 1992 was signed by the Tuareg, but the violence still 
continued and even escalated in a civil war. After four years of civil war and many 
peace efforts, thousands of people took part in the burning of thousands of weapons 
during the Flames of Peace ceremony in 1996. In 2006 another peace accord was 
initiated by Algeria, known as the Algiers Agreement, however this was soon 
followed by new uprisings against the Malian Army (Cold-Ravnkilde 2013:10). The 
lack of implementation of the agreements of 1992 and 2006 is seen as an important 
contributing factor of the crises, and also as an important reason for the current 
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crisis in Mali (Wing 2013:481). Further fighting took place between Tuareg separatist 
movements and units of the Malian army. In 2009 the Tuareg rebels retreated to 
Libya, a country with which many Tuareg have close ties. The relative peace in Mali 
after 2009 was disturbed when the regime of Qadhafi fell in the summer of 2011; 
thousands of Tuareg of Malian origins left Libya for Mali. Some of them fought for 
Qadhafi, others fought with anti-Qadhafi rebels, consequently most of them were 
heavily armed. When they returned to Mali, the fighters joined various military 
organizations or the Malian army, depending on their ethnicity and social class 
(Lecocq et al. 2013:3). In October 2011, the MNLA was created by young Tuareg from 
the National Movement of the Azawad, former Libyan soldiers, Tuareg separatists 
who took part in the rebels of 1990 and 2006, and some Tuareg politicians (Cold-
Ravnkilde 2013:24). The MNLA started an armed insurgency in January 2012 and 
fought several battles against the Malian army.      
     
The crisis of 2012     
     
It is clear that there has been a long history of uprisings and violence that preceded 
the recent crisis in Mali. The crisis is complex, and the political and security situation 
is still changing; new alliances are created and positions quickly shift (Cold-Ravnkilde 
2013:10). However, this crisis was different than the uprisings before. Especially the 
major defeats by the Malian army, in which thousands of soldiers had their throats 
slit after surrendering, made this a more dramatic situation than the uprisings in the 
past (Lecocq et al. 2013:4). The citizens of Mali took up a very angry and active role. 
Tuareg and other light-skinned Africans were attacked, and President Amadou 
Toumani Touré (ATT) was publically accused of a lack of leadership. The wives of the 
soldiers called down the president on national television; some claim this was the 
final blow to his already weakened authority (Lecocq 2013:246). On 21 and 22 
March, a coup d’état took place. The often praised ‘stable democracy’ collapsed 
entirely, and a few dozen soldiers and junior officers were able to take power 
virtually overnight. The Malian citizens had no trust whatsoever in the President; he 
had lost his legitimacy in the eyes of the population (Lecocq et al. 2013:4). After the 
coup, the Malian army collapsed. Two-thirds of the national territory in the North 
was occupied by the MNLA and other militant rebels (Lecocq et al. 2013:5). After the 
coup, the Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS (Economic Community of 
West African States) appointed Blaise Campaoré, President of Burkina Faso, to 
mediate. On the 6
th
 of April, the MNLA declared the independence of the Azawad 
Republic. Two days later was the formal resigning of ATT, creating a power-vacuum. 
Under pressure of foreign powers and Malian politicians, the junta was forced to 
transfer power to a civilian government. A turbulent period followed, in which 
civilian and military factions struggled for power, creating a very unstable political 
landscape (Lecocq et al. 2013:6). On 12 April, Diacounda Traoré was appointed as 
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interim President on 12 April, and on 17 April, Cheick Modibo Diarra was appointed 
interim Prime Minister, head of a transitional government
2
.     
The North of Mali wasn’t any more stable than the Southern part of the 
country. At first, the MNLA cooperated with other militant rebels, such as AQIM, 
Ansar Dine, the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO). Even before 
the crisis, Northern Mali was a breeding ground for jihadists and militants. Economic 
opportunities, such as drug and human trafficking and arms and cigarettes smuggling 
made jihadi insurgency a lucrative activity (Francis 2013:5). Poverty, bad governance 
and exclusion from economic and political processes created a breeding ground for 
criminal activities. The Tuareg as well as the diverse Islamic groups were united in 
their fight against a common enemy; the Malian government (Francis 2013:5). The 
collapse of ATT’s regime made it possible for the MNLA to conquer several territories 
in the North. After the MNLA took control of the cities Timbuktu, Kidal and Gao, the 
collaboration with the Islamic groups fell apart (Wing 2013:482). The MNLA lacked 
the military capacity to recapture northern towns and to defend itself against these 
militant Islamist groups (Cold-Ravnkilde 2013:24). Even though the alliance existed at 
first, it didn’t take long before the militant Islamist groups took control. The Islamic 
groups had plenty of resources, mostly gained by the holding of European hostages 
or protecting smugglers or narcotics. The resources enabled them with firepower 
and mobility superior to the Malian Army or MNLA (Lecocq et al. 2013:8).   After the 
Islamic groups took over, the civilian population of the North was submitted to Jihadi 
sharia rule (Lecocq et al. 2013:10). The bureaucracy was systematically destroyed, 
especially the symbols of francophone administration, such as schools, medical 
centers and banks. Tensions between different populations increased, and 
sometimes became lethal. Especially women were affected by the sharia 
implementation; they were subjected to strict rules of modesty and veiling, forced to 
abandon their economic activities, and flogged for the violation of rules restricting 
the listening of music or socializing.  Demonstrators would get beaten and drastic 
cases of other punishments are known, for example a case in which unmarried 
parents were stoned to death (Lecocq et al. 2013:10). The public floggings, 
amputations and stonings found their way to the international press, worrying and 
angering Malian as well as international actors (Lecocq et al. 2013:14). After the 
situation in Mali worsened, because Ansar Dine, AQIM and MUJAO started moving 
towards the South, taking control over the town of Konna, 680 kilometers of 
Bamako, and the town of Diabaly, more to the West
3
, the Malian authorities asked 
the French government on the 11
th
 of January 2013 for support to end the advances 
of terrorist groups in the North towards Bamako and to force them back. In January 
2013 AFISMA started, the African-led International Support Mission to Mali, as well 
as Operation Serval; France positioned a powerful military force in Mali; a ground 
                                                      
2
 http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minusma/background.shtml     
3
 http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minusma/background.shtml     
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force of 4000 soldiers and air power that together with AFISMA and the Malian army 
forced the Islamic groups into retreat (Francis 2013:5).   
Even though the military intervention had significantly improved the security of the 
country, serious challenges remained. February 2013 the Interim President 
Dioncounda Traoré wrote to the Secretary-General that “the objective of liberating 
the territory of Mali has not yet been reached and peace has not yet been 
established. The presence of terrorists in one part of our territory also remains a 
threat to subregional and even international security. It is therefore essential that 
the presence of the international community in Mali be designed to support first the 
restoration of territorial integrity, peace, and then the country’s stabilization. In that 
regard, I request your support for the rapid deployment of AFISMA in accordance 
with the provisions of United Nations Security Council resolution 2085 (2012) in 
order to restore the authority and sovereignty of the Malian State throughout its 
territory. The achievement of these objectives will lead towards the transformation 
of AFISMA into a United Nations stabilization and peacekeeping operation 
4
.” The 
transformation from AFISMA into a UN peacekeeping operation was realized by the 
adoption of the Security Council resolution 2100 of April 25 2013, in which is decided 
to establish the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in 
Mali (MINUSMA).     
     
        
  
                                                      
4
 http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2013/113     
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Organization     
It is often said that in small as well in large scale projects, such as MINUSMA, 
communication is the secret to success. “Communication is a central feature of the 
human endeavours. Being a good communicator as a project manager assures, in the 
end, the successful completion of the project. If the communication is a poor one, it 
can lead to differences in expectations, meaning in terms of what needs to be 
delivered at the end of the project, people being unprepared when changes occur, 
not knowing in-depth information about the status of the project and team members 
not knowing what is expected from them. Because the project climate is an ever-
changing one, the project manager must always be up-to-date with everything that is 
involved in the project” (Alexandra-Mihaela & Danut 2013: 15631564). This 
statement about managing projects can easily be related to the conflict in Mali; the 
implementation of policies is strongly dependent on human endeavours, and takes 
place in an ever-changing climate. Therefore one can assume that communication is 
a central feature for the implementation of the policies of MINUSMA. Turner (2014) 
emphasizes the importance of the involvement of stakeholders: “Communication 
should not be one-way; you should talk with people, not at people. If you want 
people committed to your project and the change it will introduce, they must feel 
involved and that they have some influence over the design. […] for this reason it is 
important that you are seen to be looking for and listening to feedback” (Turner 
2014:176).     
As indicated before, there are many actors, or stakeholders, involved in the 
conflict in Northern Mali in 2012. For an efficient implementation of the MINUSMA 
policies, one needs to involve the different stakeholders in the mission and ensure a 
proper communication with and between them. MINUSMA has very ambitious 
gender policies. However, there seems to be a discrepancy between the gender 
policies and the implementation of them. A lack of communication between the 
stakeholders could be the source of this problem. I will have a closer look the gender 
policies of MINUSMA, and present the discourses about gender and the conflict of 
the key actors involved in the conflict and mission, to analyze whether or not these 
correspond, or whether there might be a lack of communication between the actors 
involved. But first I will discuss the research methods I’ve used find to these 
perspectives.     
     
     
           
    
  
25     
     
Research Methods     
     
     
So far, I have described the existing literature about gender and conflict, and I have 
given a description of the region, as well as a historic overview of the conflict. Due to 
the describing and explaining character of the research question ‘What are the 
perspectives that various actors involved in the Malian conflict have about the role of 
gender, women and the conflict of 2012, and what do these tell us about the 
effectiveness of the gender policies of MINUSMA?’, qualitative research methods are 
needed. Qualitative research can be seen as an umbrella-concept, in which there are 
many ways and approaches to take on a research. What these different approaches 
have in common is the urge to describe, interpret and explain the behavior and 
experiences of the research population. Qualitative research is based on the idea 
that people ascribe meaning to their environment, and that their behavior is based 
on that meaning (Boeije, ‘t Hart &Hox 2009:253). The social reality of an individual is 
organized through many values, rules and symbols. These symbols enable people to 
put their experiences in a context and to add significance to their environment. 
Qualitative researchers try to understand the values and behaviors of the research 
population. To understand the social reality, it is often needed to describe more than 
one aspect of the reality; one needs to understand the context, which is called the 
‘field’ in social sciences. When the context must be understood, qualitative research 
methods are a very suitable way of conducting the research (Boeije, ‘t Hart &Hox 
2009:254).  To be able to understand the perspectives, behavior and experiences of 
the various actors involved in the Malian conflict and MINUSMA, mainly qualitative 
research methods were used. In this section, I will discuss the creation of the 
theoretical outline, describe the fieldwork in The Hague and Mali, and I will present 
the qualitative research methods, being semi-structures interviews, conversation 
analysis and participant observation. Finally I will shortly elaborate on my decision to 
use a local translator.     
     
Theoretical outline     
This research started with the establishment of a theoretical outline of the subject. 
To be able to create a historical framework and context, one needs to go into the 
existing literature about the research subject. There are many articles written about 
women and conflict, and several scientific magazines specialized in this topic. The 
conflict itself however, took place in 2012 and is relatively recent. Therefore, even 
though some articles were written shortly after the political crisis, they were 
complemented with reports of NGO’s and papers of international institutions. 
Reading through the literature, it became clear that different views about women 
and conflict exist. I have linked the images of wom
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perpetrators, simply bystanders, or supporting actors in a conflict to the agency-
structure debate. It became clear that this debate is relevant in the scientific 
literature, but in the policy papers as well, since women are often mentioned here in 
terms that reveal a structuralist approach.     
Even though every research starts with the exploration of literature, it is 
worth wondering, whether a literature study prior to the fieldwork can be at odds 
with the studying of the social reality of the research population; studying literature 
in advance, means the researcher is influenced by perspectives of other researchers. 
It is important to be prepared for the research, but to still be open to new 
experiences and findings in the field. To be able to do so, Boeije, ‘t Hart and Hox 
(2011) discuss the term ‘sensitizing concepts’. These are concepts from the existing 
literature about the subject which help the researcher to focus on factors which 
appear to be relevant, but still allow the researcher to have an open mind and focus 
on other concepts as well. This way, the concepts that are considered as relevant in 
the literature study are being verified during the research and function as a kind of 
indicator of direction. During the research the researcher can change the focus of the 
research, or the description of concepts. It is a flexible way of dealing with the 
literature; the researcher is prepared and read in on the subject, but is allowed to 
determine priorities during the research (Boeije, ‘t Hart & Hox 2011:256).      
     
Fieldwork     
Fieldwork was an important research method for this thesis. The fieldwork took 
place at the Ministry of Defense in The Hague, as well as in Bamako, Mali. Because of 
difficulties with gaining access to Mali, the fieldwork in Mali took place for three 
weeks. The research method of participant observation was conducted during these 
three weeks in Mali, as well as during my internship at the Ministry of Defense in the 
Netherlands. Especially at the Ministry of Defense this was a very useful method, 
mainly because the policies about gender are not very extensively elaborated on 
paper. It was very difficult to wrap my finger around ‘The gender policy’ of the 
Netherlands. I have analysed various documents concerning gender, such as UN-
Resolutions and the article 100-letter of the ministry of Foreign Affairs, but it was 
difficult to really understand the perspectives and objectives in the area of gender in 
related to MINUSMA. Therefore the participant observation at the Ministry of 
Defense was essential in discovering what perspectives about women, gender and 
conflict exists. By spending time at the Ministry for months, participating in several 
meetings and conferences, attending presentations and having day-to-day 
conversations with employees, I was able to get an idea of the image that exists 
about gender in general as well as the role of women in Mali specifically.      
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Participant observation     
Participant observation is considered as the most important and defining research 
method of cultural anthropology; it is a research method in which the researcher 
takes part in the daily routine of activities and interactions of a group of people to be 
able to learn their life routines or culture (DeWalt & DeWalt 2011:2). Participant 
observation is a term with which multiple methods of information gathering are 
indicated; the researcher is not only observing, but also participating in activities, 
accompanying persons from the research population and having conversations 
(Boeije, ‘t Hart & Hox 2011:265). Participant observation is actually a method that 
combines two different processes, according to Bernard (2006). On the one hand, 
there is the process of pure observation. In this case, the researcher removes himself 
as far as he can from the research scene, so that he is not able to influence the 
setting. On the other hand, there is the process of pure participation, also known as 
‘going native’. In this case the researcher adopts the identity of the participants in 
the culture, which will be at the expense of his role as a researcher (DeWalt & 
DeWalt 2011:21-22). The researcher must find a balance between these two 
extremes to be able to conduct a qualitative research. The balance between 
observation and participation achieved by an individual researcher can fall anywhere 
along the continuum. The key point is that researchers should be aware of the 
compromises in access, objectivity, and community expectations that are being 
made at any particular place along the continuum.” (DeWalt & DeWalt 2011:28). It is 
important to keep in mind that the researcher is responsible to determine and 
maintain the balance, and to take the time to reflect on his role as a researcher. 
Bernard (2006) defines it: “Participant observation involves immersing yourself in a 
culture and learning to remove yourself every day from that immersion so you can 
intellectualize what you’ve seen and heard, put it into perspective, and write about it 
convincingly. When it’s done right, participant observation turns fieldworkers into 
instruments of data analysis” (DeWalt & DeWalt 2011:29). This last quote also 
indicates a danger in participant observation: the so-called Ethnographer Bias. 
During participant observation, the fieldworker becomes a research instrument 
herself, and therefore the possibility exists that the fieldworker can influence the 
research results. DeWalt and DeWalt (2011) name as example the danger that 
researchers can romanticize their research setting, and that they can overlook 
negative results. Because of the danger of the Ethnographer Bias, it is necessary to 
combine participant observations with other research methods (DeWalt & DeWalt 
2011:95).     
     
Semi-structures interviews and discourse analysis     
As has been said, fieldwork was conducted at the Dutch Ministry of Defense as well 
as in Mali. The fieldwork in Mali could only take place for three weeks, a short 
amount of time. Besides participant observation, another method was used in Mali; 
28     
semistructured interviewing. This means that “the interview guide includes a list of 
questions and prompts in order to increase the likelihood that all topics will be 
covered in each interview in more or less the same way” (DeWalt & DeWalt 
2011:139). The reason that the method of semi-structured interview was chosen, is 
because of the limited amount of time that was available to spend in the research 
area. By using a list of topics and questions, one can be sure that all topics are 
covered during an interview, and nothing is forgotten. A total of 21 semi-structured 
interviews was conducted in Mali, combined with several casual conversations, and 
the participation in meetings. In order to meet new informants I’ve used the 
‘snowball-method’, a technique in which the networks of informants are used to get 
more informants (Boeije, ‘t Hart & Hox 2011:265).      
  The semi-structured interviews and conversations were combined with discourse 
analysis. Van Dijk (2001) explains why this type of analysis can be necessary: 
“Language use, discourse, verbal interaction, and communication belong to the 
microlevel of the social order. Power, dominance, and inequality between social 
groups are typically terms that belong to a macrolevel of analysis. This means that 
CDA [Critical Discourse Analysis] has to theoretically bridge the well-known "gap" 
between micro and macro approaches” (Van Dijk 2001:354). In other words, day-to-
day interaction and conversations can reveal a lot of information about underlying 
power relations. Analyzing the discourses and interactions of the men and women in 
Mali as well as in The Hague, helped me with gaining insight in the social relations 
and understanding the perspectives of the participants.      
During the fieldwork in the Hague the gender advisor of the Ministry of 
Defense, the gender advisor of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, soldiers of various 
positions returned from international missions; varying from chaplains to employees 
of communication departments were interviewed. During my stay in Mali, I was able 
to interview 21 people, including sixteen women. Eleven of the women were actively 
involved in women’s organizations, and eight of them were in the North of the 
country during the occupation. Next to these sixteen women, I have also interviewed 
five men, one of them being Moussa Mara, the prime minister of Mali. Being able to 
interview the prime minister during the relatively short stay in Mali, is a good 
example of the environment in which the fieldwork took place. One the one hand, 
this is a very limited environment, regarding for example the poor infrastructure of 
the country. On the other hand it is a country where everything is possible: 
completely uninvited and despite forgetting to even bring my passport, I managed to 
speak to the prime minister and even to get a ride at the back of the motorcycle of 
one of his security guards.      
     
Local translator     
To communicate in the most efficient way, I had the help from a young local 
translator. The help of this translator can be seen as a disputable decision, especially 
since it was a man, and the research took place in an area in which women are not 
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used to talk about their problems with men. I have taken this into consideration, but 
I also saw a positive side of having a local translator; he was able to communicate 
according the cultural customs, he was able to explain local situations and he could 
point out important factors I otherwise might have missed or misinterpreted. In my 
experience the women I interviewed were not deterred by the presence of a man, 
but instead very relieved to tell their stories and share their experiences with me. 
Even difficult and gendered subject such as rape or forced marriage were discussed 
freely. Therefore I am glad that I have decided to hire a local assistant to help me 
out. By using the research methods describes above, of which participant 
observation and semi-structured interviews were the most important, I was able to 
find out what the perspectives of the various actors involved in the Malian conflict 
are about the role of women in the context of the conflict of 2012. The results of the 
research are presented in the next chapter, starting with the perspectives of the 
United Nations.     
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Discourses     
     
United Nations     
As indicated at the beginning of my thesis, gender is explicitly mentioned as a key 
topic in the policies of MINUSMA. Although the topic is presented in such an 
ambitious way, I found it difficult to wrap my finger about ‘the’ gender policy of 
MINUSMA. There are no documents defining what the gender policy of MINUSMA 
exactly is; instead gender is mentioned in various UN security resolutions, the 
mandate, and other documents concerning the mission. This is why I have made a 
distinction between what is said about gender in the resolutions of the United 
Nations, and in the following paragraph the discourses of the Dutch government, 
followed by the perspectives of the soldiers on the ground.      
The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali was 
established to “support the political process and carry out a number of 
securityrelated stabilization tasks, with a focus on major population centres and lines 
of communication, protecting civilians, human rights monitoring, the creation of 
conditions for the provision of humanitarian assistance and the return of displaced 
persons, the extension of State authority and the preparation of free, inclusive and 
peaceful elections
5
”. In short, the mission is intended to support the political process 
and to help to stabilize the country. The rules of engagement of the mission are 
robust, with a mandate “to use all necessary means to address threats to the 
implementation of its mandate, which would include protection of civilians under 
imminent threat of physical violence and protection of United Nations personnel 
from residual threats, within its capabilities and its areas of deployment
6
” The 
mandate appears to be quite broad, which is likely to be a conscious decision. A 
MINUSMA employee told me that in “the interpretation of the mandate, there is a 
gigantic amount of leeway, and it is determined by the circumstances […] You can go 
in every direction, that is why this is an excellent mandate”.      
UNSR 2100     
MINUSMA is established in the Security Council resolution 2100 (UNSC 2013). 
Looking at what is said about women in this Resolution, an interesting perspective on 
women is revealed. Women are mentioned eight times in the eleven-paged 
Resolution. Six times, they are mentioned in the context of violence and protection, 
for example: “[The Security Council] Urges Member States, regional and 
international organizations to provide coordinated assistance, expertise and training, 
including on human rights and international humanitarian law, especially concerning 
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the protection of women and children” (Resolution 2100, 2013:9). Interesting in this 
sentence is the fact that women are being aligned with children, and thereby put 
into a passive and vulnerable role. The concept of ‘women and children’ is 
mentioned quite often in this Resolution, such as on the next page: “[The Security 
Council] Requests that MINUSMA take fully into account the need to protect civilians 
and mitigate risk to civilians, including, in particular, women, children and displaced 
persons” (Resolution 2100, 2013:10). In this part of the Resolution, women are 
aligned with children as well as displaced persons, reaffirming the victimized and 
passive roles women are ascribed.    
However, women are not solely seen as passive victims, and the necessity of 
including women in decision-making processes is also declared. In the same 
resolution (Resolution 2100), the Security Council requests MINUSMA to take gender 
consideration into account as a cross-cutting issue throughout its mandate and  to 
assist the transitional authorities of Mali in ensuring the participation, representation 
of women at all levels and at an early stage of the stabilization phases.  (Resolution 
2100, 2013:10). It also promotes the inclusion of women’s organizations in the 
national dialogue and reconciliation process (Resolution 2100, 2013:7). Finally, it 
recalls the earlier resolutions about women and conflict, such as UNSR 1325. UNSR 
1325 is the best-known security resolution about women and conflict, and will be 
analyzed in the next paragraph.     
UNSCR 1325     
On October the 31
st
 2000 the United Nations Security Council adopted the 
Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security. The resolution stresses the 
importance of the role of women in “the prevention and resolution of conflicts, 
peace negotiations, peace-building, peacekeeping, humanitarian response and in 
post-conflict reconstruction and stresses the importance of their equal participation 
and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and 
security
7
”. This resolution also encourages all actors to create a gender perspective 
in all peace and security efforts, and to take special measures to protect women and 
girls from gender-based violence in conflict situations.  On the one hand, women are 
recognized as victims, as can be seen in statements such as the following: 
“Expressing concern that civilians, particularly women and children, account for the 
vast majority of those adversely affected by armed conflict, including as refugees and 
internally displaced persons, and increasingly are targeted by combatants and armed 
elements, and recognizing the consequent impact this has on durable peace and 
reconciliation,” (UNSCR 1325 2000:1). At the other hand however, there is 
recognition of the important role women are able to play in resolving conflicts: 
“Reaffirming the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of 
conflicts and in peacebuilding, and stressing the importance of their equal 
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participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion 
of peace and security, and the need to increase their role in decision-making with 
regard to conflict prevention and resolution,” (UNSCR 1325 2000:1). However, 
reaffirming the important roles of women in the prevention and resolution of 
conflicts without providing a base for this reaffirming, can become dangerously close 
to stereotyping women: “thereby creating the assumption that this is somehow a 
"natural" role for women. This both discounts the reality of women as combatants 
and supporters of conflict and undermines women's agency throughout and after 
conflict. Women are placed in a dovible bind: if they are "natural" peacemakers, 
their efforts in this respect are not credited, while they are simultaneously excluded 
from formal peacemaking processes” (Chinkin & Kaldor 2013: 181). Even though 
women are mentioned in the resolutions and the importance of their roles are 
emphasized, unwilling assumptions about their ‘natural’ behavior are being made.    
Another interesting statement in the resolution, especially in the case of Mali, 
is the recommendation of gender sensitive training for peacekeepers: “Recognizing 
also the importance of the recommendation contained in the statement of its 
President to the press of 8 March 2000 for specialized training for all peacekeeping 
personnel on the protection, special needs and human rights of women and children 
in conflict situations,” (UNSCR 1325 2000:2). Resolution 1325 is binding upon all 
nation states, and is unanimously adopted. On the one hand, UNSR 1325 is 
celebrated, because it shows political recognition that gender is relevant to 
international peace and security: actors have a document with which they can hold 
governments accountable. On the other hand, critics state that there is no 
accountability-mechanism, which means that there are no sanctions for 
governments that violate the resolution. Therefore UNSCR 1325 is sometimes 
referred to as a  
‘paper tiger’.      
     
Discourse United Nations     
Analyzing the policies of the United Nations, it looks like the UN is trying to find a 
balance between the image of women as victims and the image of women as agents. 
Women are sometimes aligned with children and displaced persons in their 
resolutions, classifying women as passive beings. This reveals a structuralist point of 
view. On the other hand however, the necessity of including women in conflict 
resolution and peace building is also clearly emphasized. Not only in resolutions 
revolving about women in conflict, such as the UNSR 1325, but also in the mandate 
of the mission in Mali attention is given to this subject, for example in the statement 
that women should be represented at all levels and at an early stage of the 
stabilization phases.  (Resolution 2100, 2013:10). Unfortunately an explanation for 
the importance of including women is missing, which leads to a stereotypical thought 
of women as ‘natural peacekeepers’. But overall, one can conclude that theoretically 
it seems like the intention of considering women as equal partners and agents in 
conflict resolution is there. But whether or not the policies are efficiently being 
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implemented in practice remains the question. In the next paragraph, the Dutch 
contribution to MINUSMA is defined, to see whether or not this is in line with the 
policies of the United Nations.     
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The Dutch government     
It is clear that the United Nations seem to be very committed to integrating gender 
in their policies and missions, at least in their documents. Regarding the 
implementation of the UNSCR 1325, 46 countries including the Netherlands have 
adopted a National Action Plan
8
 (NAP).      
     
The NAP     
The NAP is a collaboration between the government, civil society organizations and 
research institutes. The ultimate goal of the signatories of the document is: “to 
jointly facilitate the creation of an enabling environment for women’s leadership and 
political participation in fragile states, conflict and post-conflict areas and transition 
countries, allowing for more inclusive, just and sustainable peace, recovery and 
reconstruction processes” (NAP 2012-1015:8).  The NAP is created to be a tool for 
information-exchange, and to initiate discussion and increased joint action among all 
actors involved in the implementation of the UN Security Resolution 1325 (NAP 
2012-2015:7). The document also functions as a tool to show intentions of 
organization: “with their signature on this document, their intentions are now 
visible. This Action Plan is thus a reiteration of the commitment of all signatories to 
intensify their work on the implementation of UNSCR 1325 over the next four years” 
(NAP 2012-20125:7). Because UNSCR 1325 is about women peace and security, the 
focus of the NAP is mainly at areas which lack security and stability; “fragile states, 
countries in conflict and post-conflict situations, and countries in transition” (NAP 
2012-2015:8). The definition of a fragile state is given in the NAP: “A state is fragile 
when the central government does not exert effective control over its own territory 
and is unable or unwilling to assure the provision of vital services (such as safety, 
security, education, etc.) to significant parts of its territory. The legitimacy of the 
government is weak or non-existent and violent conflict is a reality or a great risk. 
We have broadened the scope of this definition to include states that are emerging 
from conflict or are in postconflict transition, which often suffer from the same 
problems with service delivery and legitimacy”(NAP 2012-2015:49). It is quite clear 
that Mali fits in this definition and therefore one can assume that the ideals of the 
NAP should be taken into account within MINUSMA. Especially since the Ministry of 
Defense, as well as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs both declared their intention to 
support the active execution of the Dutch NAP (NAP 2012-2015:4). However specific 
action plans are not presented in the document. This is explained, by stating that the 
detailed plans are left out on purpose, to be able to be flexible and response quickly 
to developments. It is also stated that the lack of detailed action plans and the 
flexible approach do not mean that there is a lack of accountability (NAP 2012- 
2015:8).      
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During the public event about the National Action Plan ‘Women in Warzones: 
Security for All
9
’, hopeful and ambitious voices were heard: ‘The Netherlands as front 
runner in supporting women in conflict areas’ is the name of the article about the 
event. The Dutch minister Opstelten said: “If this afternoon shows us one thing, it is 
that the United Nation Security Resolution 1325 is alive, you can feel it as you enter 
the room” (20 December 2013). Commodore Theo ten Haaf, substitute Director 
Operations, ministry of defense stated that all gender-aspects in all elements of the 
mission in Mali will be taken into account: “Not because we have to, but because it 
works” (20 December 2013). Besides the NAP, the commitment to the inclusion of 
women is also emphasized in the article 100-letter aimed at the chairman of the 
Second Chamber. “Gender is a priority for MINUSMA. The gender unit of the mission 
aims at the policy-making to improve the participation of women in the political 
process and to integrate the gender dimension in transitional justice and security 
sector transformation processes” (Artikel 100-brief MINUSMA, 2013:12). Gender is 
referred to as one of the primary objectives of the Dutch policy (Artikel 100-brief 
MINUSMA, 2013:13).       
We have seen in the various UN Security Resolutions and the accompanying 
Dutch Action Plan that the United Nations as well as the Dutch government claim to 
see gender as an important aspect in military missions. Looking at the several 
documents relevant for military missions, such as the resolutions and the MINUSMA 
mandate, one might be quite positive and hopeful about the gender aspects of the 
mission in Mali, and one might expect that the Dutch approach will be very 
gendersensitive and gender-focused.      
     
The Dutch contribution     
The Netherlands are contributing to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated 
Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). This mission started on the 1st of July 
2013, then led by UN Secretary-General's Special Representative Bert Koenders. The 
Dutch contribution consists of around 450 personnel. These are three teams of 
special operation forces, 220 of intelligence personnel, 30 police trainers and civilian 
experts to train policemen and reform the security sector. The Netherlands also 
contribute with 4 apache helicopters for explorations and escorts, 3 chinook 
helicopters for medical evacuations. Also, there is a deployment of civil experts, such 
as experts in gender, cultural heritage and protection of civilians.     
The ministry of defense provides the following reasons why the Dutch military 
contributes to this mission
10
:     
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- The unstable North of Mali is seen as a breeding place of violence, criminality 
and extremism and therefore a threat to Europe and the Netherlands.      
- Humanitarian help is needed, because the Malian civilians should be 
protected from the violence and poverty.      
- The Northern part of Africa is an important trading partner for the 
Netherlands for natural and energy resources, an unstable Mali might put this 
trading position in danger.      
- Mali has specifically asked the international community for help. Besides this, 
the United Nations has asked the Netherlands for a contribution, and with 
this contribution a critical need of MINUSMA is being met.     
- MINUSMA has operational and realizable objectives.     
- The Netherlands have a strong position in Mali, because of the reliable and 
neutral position of development partner.     
- The Netherlands will benefit from international cooperation: with this 
contribution to international stability and legal order, the interests of the 
Netherlands are being served in the long term.     
     
The contribution of the Netherlands is mainly focused on the gathering and 
processing of intelligence. The gathering of intelligence is of great importance for the 
mission, since the intelligence are the fundaments for the decision-making and 
planning of the operation. Also, the intelligence is very important for the safety of 
the deployed soldiers. In Gao there are special operation teams for the long distance 
explorations. Besides gathering information in further areas, these teams are also 
responsible for the arresting of combatants who fabricate explosives and the 
dismantling of hidden weapon depositories. All intelligence flows will reach the All 
Sources Information Fusion Unit (AFISU), of which the head quarter is based in 
Bamako. The operational parts of AFISMA are based in Timbuktu and Gao; these 
divisions are responsible for the gathering and processing of intelligence from their 
areas. A Dutch ASIFU company is responsible for the gathering and analyzing the 
intelligence in the area of Gao. To gather and analyze intelligence, a human terrain 
team, as well as two unmanned aerial vehicles is being used. The intelligence 
consists of information about the armed groups in the area, but also contributes to a 
holistic view of the situation by also focusing on the political, military, economic, 
infrastructural domain 
10  
. AFISMA analyzes the information as well as the 
information of the commando’s, and redirects the information. MINUSMA is very 
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reliable on the quality of intelligence. Therefore, the Dutchmen are sometimes 
referred to as ‘the eyes and ears’ of the mission
11
.     
     
It is clear that the Dutch government presents itself as being very committed 
to taking gender into account and including women in the decision-making 
processes. However, it is questionable whether in practice this is achieved. The 
teams that gathered intelligence mainly consisted of white, male soldiers. I 
expressed my surprise about this, and I was told that this is the case because there 
are not enough female soldiers who speak French. But I was ensured that local 
women were very opinionated and free and that this wouldn’t be a problem at all. 
When I asked the local women whether or not they would speak to white men, they 
offered an interesting and relevant point of view:      
     
“They [the women] are not going to say their problems to them. You’re going to see 
the results. I know for sure, they are not going to share the stories of the problems of 
rape. You should include women, even if it’s just one woman, an influential woman. 
They might speak to the men, but it’s not going to be intimate information. It’s going 
to be what everybody knows. Our traditions and cultures don’t allow us to talk. […] If 
you bring only men, you’re not going to find results. Here women talk to women 
about that kind of problems” (Marhianna, woman from Bamako, interviewed on 
June 26,  2014).      
     
Another woman replied:      
     
“If it’s a Dutch woman they will be more comfortable sharing than with the men. But 
if you want to have good information you need a local woman who is known in Gao. 
[…] It’s better to include two women in the team. Even here in Bamako a woman 
doesn’t talk to men about serious problems. You can talk to women but they will 
never tell you ‘my daughter has been raped’ or ‘I have been raped’. They should get 
a woman from Gao, they know and trust, because it will be difficult to get 
information. It’s not going to be easy for them, to get a woman to talk about this 
kind of problems, not easy at all.” (Mariam, woman from Bamako, interviewed on 
June 24, 2014).       
     
These replies makes one wonder whether all perspectives are being heard if mainly 
white males are the ones gathering the information. According to the gender advisor 
of the Dutch ministry of Foreign Affairs, it is possible for men to talk to women in 
Mali, when they have the right amount of training and tools to do so. He explained 
that especially the Dutch military police was well prepared and that they were given 
the tools to talk to Malian women and to include them in the processes. But when 
this unit was in Mali, it turned out that they were too well prepared in comparison 
with the rest of the MINUSMA units; they were very motivated to start their gender-
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approach, but once they were deployed, there was no clarity about what to do with 
their information concerning gender within the MINUSMA organization and whom to 
turn to with regard to this subject. “These type of things show that the mission is not 
yet at full strength. We should have done some expectation management” (Gender 
advisor, The Hague, 10 February 2015). A legitimate question to ask here is: are the 
Dutch police troops too well prepared, as the gender advisor stated, or are the rest 
of the units not prepared enough? With such ambitious policies, full commitment is 
needed to implement them, and this commitment seems to be missing in practice. It 
is clear that there is definitely scope for improvement in the implementation of these 
policies. Employees in Mali stated that is usually takes a year of two before a mission 
is effective and at full strength. Another aspect of the mission that might promises 
too many expectations is the socalled gender unit of MINUSMA. “The gender unit of 
MINUSMA must ensure that gender is integrated in the actions of MINUSMA. But to 
be honest, there is really not enough capacity to achieve that. It is a very small unit, 
but countries can send employees at their own expenses and initiative” (Gender 
advisor, The Hague, 10 February 2015). In conclusion, it is very important to realize 
that from a Dutch point of view, it seems logical that it is possible that men talk 
freely to women, but the Malian women I interviewed definitely don’t see this as a 
possibility. This shows that it is difficult to adjust the policies to the local culture and 
traditions. Besides this, there is a great difference between the desired effects, 
which is the inclusion of women and a gender sensitive-approach, and the amount of 
preparation and training the MINUSMA units receive to reach these effects.     
     
Discourse of the Dutch government     
Looking at the Dutch contribution, it is clear that on paper the affiliation and 
commitment to gender and the involvement of women is high. Even though women 
are sometimes seen as victims, they are also definitely seen as actors who must be 
involved in decision-making processes. However, there appears to be a great 
difference between theory and practice. There is not enough capacity to take gender 
into account in every aspect of the mission, and some cultural aspects that need a 
sensitive approach, such as men talking to women, are not taken into account. Even 
though these are policies clearly designed from a Western point of view, at the 
political level is a realization that there is scope for improvement: “The commitment 
is there, but not the capacity. Compared to other troops, the Dutch soldiers are 
actually too well prepared. Some countries are still trying to answer the ‘Why-
question’: Why do we need to involve women? We are at the ‘How-question’: How 
do we involve them? But compared to the mandate, we still have a long way to go” 
(Gender advisor, The Hague, 10 February 2015). In the next section the discourse of 
soldiers on the ground will be presented.     
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Soldiers on the ground     
Analyzing the perspectives of the soldiers on the ground, three things immediately 
stand out: the lack of gender-focused training in most of the units, the feelings of 
gender being imposed by politicians and the easily-made comparison with 
Afghanistan.     
Every soldier who is deployed on a mission receives a general training. In the 
general education, which is not mission-specific, but which applies to every mission, 
some attention is given to gender.      
     
The objectives of the gender training are
11
:      
- To obtain knowledge about the role and position of the local women and 
men in the deployment area.     
- To know how to interact with the role and position of local women during a 
conflict.     
- To understand how to deal with your own values and the equality between 
men and women in the deployment area.     
     
Even though these are clear objectives, it turned out that not every soldier learns 
about gender aspects in the mission oriented training. At the time I was in Bamako, 
there were no gender-engagement teams, and hardly any gender-specialized training 
that the Dutch soldiers received. The amount of gender-related training soldiers 
receive before being deployed differs per mission.  In the mission to Afghanistan, the 
former military mission that the Netherlands have contributed to, a lot of attention 
was given to gender: there were many gender advisors, and specific gender 
engagement teams. In MINUSMA, this was not the case at the time of my stay. A 
sergeant who just returned from the first rotation of the mission in Mali, told me 
that no attention was given to gender in his training; non-whatsoever. He did receive 
some cultural-training, but this was mostly about the history of the conflict. “It is 
important to understand the context of the conflict, the history, because sometimes 
people refer to that. But gender is obviously not a priority in this mission. The gender 
policies are looking very nice on paper, but they are not that great in practice.” 
When I asked soldiers who just returned from their deployment about gender, most 
of them could hardly remember the gender-related training they received. The 
experience of this sergeant and his colleagues is confirmed by a MINUSMA 
employee, who stated that very little attention was given to the subject of gender in 
the preparations for the mission. When looking at the training schedule for all 
soldiers, one training day is assigned to cultural lessons. During this one day of 
training, 20 minutes are actually reserved for gender aspects. The other cultural 
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lessons include role playing games, which are mostly aimed at the ability to interact 
with soldiers of different countries and backgrounds. It is clear that there are many 
subjects that need to be part of the training, such as dealing with the media, 
intercultural communication and hygiene. Therefore there is not much time to 
extensively elaborate on the subject of gender.    The lack of gender-focused training 
of the soldiers of the early rotation can be ascribed to the slow start of the mission. 
According to the gender advisor of the ministry of foreign affairs, the ministry now 
provides a one-day course for every soldier that is being deployed to Mali. Three 
subjects are being thought in this course: gender, protection of civilians and the 
Dutch policy in Mali. He states that even though the mission-focused education is 
based on the image of women as victims, this extra course aims at involving women 
as actors in the processes: “We try to explain that it is a good idea to involve women 
in the gathering of intelligence. Women know best what is going on in the 
environment. They know what is needed, they are more in tune with the 
environment. If you don’t approach women, you will gather incomplete information, 
and you will make the wrong decisions” (Gender advisor, The Hague, 10 February 
2015). This one-day course obviously is a great improvement compared to the 
complete lack of training the soldiers of the first MINUSMA rotation received,  and 
the image of women as important actors is also a welcome development. However, 
it is questionable whether a one-day course in which gender is one of the three 
subjects is enough to meet the ambitious policies, in which gender is presented as a 
‘priority in MINUSMA,’ especially since this message is not an easy one to transfer: 
“A lot of participants do not understand the importance of involving women. That is 
why a lot of time is spent on explaining why it is important to involve women in 
MINUSMA. This means there is not much time to teach people a different way of 
perceiving, or to give them practical tools” (Gender advisor, The Hague, 10 February  
2015).       
This comment about not understanding the importance of women is often 
confirmed by soldiers; I often found that the word ‘gender’ even caused irritation. It 
is clearly perceived as a topic that is imposed on the military by politicians, who do 
not understand what it is like to be part of a military mission. “Political parties often 
make decisions about things they don’t understand. Sometimes it doesn’t make any 
sense at all; for example, in the former mission to Afghanistan, the Dutch Christian 
parties wanted us to protect the Christians in the area, while we were in an area in 
which there were no Christians at all” (a soldier who just returned from deployment 
in Mali).  Even officers quite high in the hierarchy of the organization are jokingly 
complaining about having to talk about gender.      
Another often-heard phrase is a comparison to other missions; an easily made 
link is comparing MINUSMA to the mission of Afghanistan. Many soldiers who are 
deployed in MINUSMA have fresh memories of their former deployment in 
Afghanistan, and the comparison between the countries is very common. Even in the 
intelligence department of the ministry - again, quite high in the hierarchy of the 
organization – these sounds are being heard. “They can tell me everything they want 
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to, but it is exactly the same situation in Afghanistan, I’m telling you, exactly the 
same. The corrupt leadership, the insurgency.. it is exactly the same” (Soldier from 
the intelligence section). Often people are not very enthusiastic about the 
genderapproach in the mission in Afghanistan. This is seen as a reason why it 
wouldn’t work in Mali either. “Should we just take women from the streets and 
include them in negotiations? We have tried including women in Afghanistan, but 
that just didn’t work!” (Woman from policy department). Especially since both of the 
countries are Islamic states, the comparison seems to make sense to many people. 
“The Christian societies are developed 600 years before than the Islamic ones. We 
need to give them the time to develop at their own pace, without imposing our 
values on them. There, it is the man who puts food on the table, and it is the man 
who makes the decisions. The woman is in charge of the house, while the man is in 
charge outside of the house. Therefore it is logical that the women are kept out of 
the official negotiations” (Soldier, just returned from deployment).      
     
Discourse of the soldiers on the ground     
Looking at the conversations with soldiers on the ground, the dominant perspective 
about women is one in which women are seen as victims who do not really have an 
important role to play. This might be due to a lack of gender focused-training. There 
appears to be a lack of understanding about why taking gender into account might 
be an advantage in meeting objectives of the mission. A lack of cultural and gender 
education also leads to the easily-made comparison to Afghanistan, and sometimes 
stereotyping of women and Islam. At a higher level in the organization, there does 
seem to be commitment to taking gender into account: “I see two types of people at 
the Ministry of Defense: one type is saying; politicians think this is important, so we 
must deal with this. The other type really understands the importance of integrating 
gender. I haven’t met people who really didn’t think this was important” (Gender 
advisor, The Hague, 10 February 2015).  There are some people within the ministry 
who are trying to change the attitude towards this subject, and who are convinced of 
the necessity to include local women in the decision-making process, and who are 
convinced that this is beneficial to the effectiveness of the mission. However, it looks 
like the vast majority sees gender as an unnecessary topic, imposed by politicians. In 
the next section, the perspective of local women will be presented.     
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Local women     
     
 Muso kòni danbe ye cède yè: It is the man who gives the woman her dignity     
     
This is a popular Bambara saying in Mali. This saying suggests a structuralist point of 
view on the position of women in the Malian society, in which the woman’s dignity is 
dependent of her husband. In this section I will focus on the perspectives of local 
women in Mali; looking at the occupation in 2012, it is clear that Malian women 
often found themselves in the position of victim. Several of my informants have 
described women as the ‘first victims’ of the conflict. All informants emphasized the 
very tough conditions that women had to deal with during the occupation. It is clear 
that the Jihadists as well as the MNLA were very violent. Many women spoke about 
the great amount of violence and destruction that the MNLA and jihadist groups 
brought to their cities. Aicha sums up the consequences of the occupation for the 
women in Gao:     
     
“Women were raped, violated, their rights were taken away. But I can only speak for 
the women in Gao. The women were taking care of the expenses of their family. The 
woman pays for the food, the medical care for her family. When the Jihadists came 
to Gao, the women didn’t have the right to go out. When they went to the market to 
buy food, when they went to their businesses; they had no rights to do any of those 
things. The people in Gao were not able to live a normal live. If a woman was caught 
buying something at the market, and she wasn’t veiled, she would be sent to prison. 
When a woman was caught on the road, and she was not veiled, she would be sent 
to prison” (Aicha, woman from Gao, interviewed on July 5, 2014).     
     
Aicha speaks about Gao, but in other cities in the North that were occupied there 
were similar circumstances.      
     
“When the jihadists were in Timbuktu, women were forced to cover their heads and 
to wear black gloves and socks. The jihadists brought the clothes that you had to buy 
from them. Women were not allowed to go out, women were not allowed to go to 
the market and sell, do their commerce. They were not even allowed to go outside 
and buy food, if you were not covered up. And if they caught you, without a head 
scarf you would get 40 lashes.” (Lamina, woman from Timbuktu, interviewed on June 
20, 2014)     
     
Because of these strict rules and violations, it was difficult for women to resist what 
was happening to them. A woman from Timbuktu explains why:      
“Women had enough of the jihadists. They revolted the clothing, they had to wear 
long sleeves, there was like a law that said you have to be clothed like this and the 
women had enough of that. And the women revolted. Afterwards they were beaten, 
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they had to say what they had to say. They were peaceful, but after a time they had 
enough. When the jihadist try to arrest them they screamed, ran, protested. They 
didn’t have means to resist”. (Aissata, woman from Timbuktu, interviewed on June 
20, 2014)     
     
The informants explained that it wasn’t allowed for women to be in the presence 
with a male adult that wasn’t her husband. Some women even described how 
women were beaten, because they were in the presence of their own family.      
     
“There was a woman in Gao. Her son had picked her up on a bike. Then they called 
the woman and beat her up. Why? She was with a man who wasn’t her husband. 
That day the mother went to the jihadists and said: ‘that’s not in the Koran; you can 
be with your son’. But they said her son is a man. And a woman should not be with 
another man other than her husband.” (Marhianna, woman from Bamako, 
interviewed on June 26, 2014).     
     
The Sharia law also prohibited the consuming of alcohol. One woman from Timbuktu 
told a story of a woman she knew, who sold cigarettes and beer.      
     
“The Jihadists came at night, they tied her tightly, and they took everything; gold, 
money, all her goods, and they put her in this Islamic prison. So this lady was in 
prison and was tied up and she was hanged in a very small room. And she said on the 
first floor is when they decided to rape someone, it was there where they brought a 
person, but if you stayed downstairs for example, it’s when they put you in this small 
prison. She was hanged on something she doesn’t know what, but her feet couldn’t 
touch the ground and it was in a small prison downstairs. Upstairs they brought 
people they wanted to rape”.  (Kadi, woman from Timbuktu, interviewed on July 2, 
2014)     
     
So besides the strict rules of the imposed Sharia Law, women were also often the 
victims of sexual violence. I spoke to a victim of sexual violence. She was 30 years 
old, and was actually pregnant during the brutal rape.      
     
“For me, it happened when I was going to get water with one of my friends. I was 
taken from the road. They tied me up, and beat me up. They blinded my eyes. When 
they had beaten me up, they raped me with five men. When the raped happened, I 
was pregnant. But I got sick after the rape. I had family members in Bamako who 
have helped me with the medical needs, but I couldn’t give birth anymore, as a 
consequence of the rape. I don’t know who they [the perpetrators] were; I could 
only see their eyes.”  (Khadijatou, woman from Gaundam, interviewed on June 29, 
2014)  Khadijatou was in Gaundam during the occupation. She doesn’t know 
whether the men who raped her were from the MNLA or an Islamist group, and she 
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stated that she doesn’t know the difference between them. “When they first came, 
they said they were Muslims just like us and that they were just there to help the 
population of Gaundum to understand the Islam. That was how they treated people. 
But later we found out that the Jihadists who claimed to be Muslims, were raping 
women. That was not according to the religion, but for their own gain.”     
     
There are obviously physical consequences of a rape case, which can be as bad as 
losing an unborn child, such as this women described. In many societies in Mali 
however, the social consequences of sexual violence might be even worse.      
     
“What happened [the rape] was a bad thing. When it usually happens, people don’t 
want to be near you. You become reluctant for other people. Even now it is the case, 
when you pass by, people will call you that, people will say stuff to hurt your feelings. 
Many women hide what happened to them. Those who hide are scared that people 
will find out, they are living with a dark secret.” (Khadijatou, woman from Gaundam, 
interviewed on June 29, 2014)     
     
Another woman from the area of Timbuktu knows how shameful it is for a woman to 
tell that she has been raped.       
     
“I know only one woman who is open enough to tell that she was raped. After she 
was raped by many men simultaneously, her husband divorced her. The other 
women, after they were raped by many men, simultaneously, they absolutely didn’t 
want anybody to know, because of the social consequences.” (Kadi, woman from 
Timbuktu, interviewed on July 2, 2014).     
      
Women were not only raped, but there were also forced marriages under jihadist 
rule. A woman explained how these marriages took place:     
     
“They go to your house. And you have a daughter of 15-16 years old. And they’re 
going to take her and say they marry her. And you cannot oppose them. If you do 
that, they tell you that you do not what God asks to do. When you’re a girl and 
you’re 14, you suppose to marry, that’s what they say. A woman was beaten because 
of that, because she opposed the jihadists, and she didn’t want her daughter to 
marry at fifteen, sixteen. So they beat her up. And they showed the pictures on 
national television” (Marhianna, woman from Bamako, interviewed on June 26, 
2014).      
     
Another woman explained that forced marriages were not between one man and 
one woman: “There were around five men marrying one woman. These men would 
all contribute to a dowry, so that if the woman or her family complained, the men 
would say; we all contributed to your dowry, so we are all legally married to you.” 
(Aicha, woman from Gao, interviewed on July 5, 2014). Unfortunately it seems not 
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very surprising that sexual violence took place within a forced marriage, but often 
this is denied. A great problem in Mali at the moment is traumatized women who 
don’t come forward with their experiences.      
According to some women, the area in which the sexual violence took place is 
important for the consequences. One woman stated that in Timbuktu it is more 
difficult to come forward than in Gao. She told me that the reason for this, is that the 
Timbuctu region is more traditional than Gao, and in Gao the social consequences 
are less severe than in Timbuctu. Another possibility is that not only the area, but 
also the ethnic identities of the women make a difference; the theoretical part of this 
thesis shows that the amount of freedom and agency women endure varies per 
ethnic group.     
     
“A big problem we have now in Timbuktu is that in Gao, women and girl who were 
raped, came and said ‘we were raped’, but in Timbuktu the girls and women who 
were raped never came forward. We know the women and girls who are raped, but 
they are denying it. If people know that you are raped, you will never get married 
again. In society you are going to be cast out. We went to the families and were 
trying to sensibilize, and ask them to send their girls, their daughters and sisters and 
say what happened, but even now people are not coming forward.” (Lamina, woman 
from Timbuktu, interviewed on June 20, 2014).      
     
One woman explains it very well, stating that a woman is victimized twice after a 
rape: “you are a victim two times; first of the rape itself, second of the society in 
which you are treated as an outcast” (Fatoumata, researcher from Bamako, 
interviewed on June 26, 2014). The social consequences obviously have impact on 
the amount of women who are willing to talk about sexual violence. The Tuareg 
women I’ve spoken to, tried to ensure me that in Kidal no sexual violence took place 
at all. But employees of NGO’s I’ve spoken to told me that a lot of women were 
raped in Kidal. I don’t know which story is true, but it is important to realize the 
different backgrounds and interests that might play a part here. For example, Iyad Ag 
Ghaly, the leader of Ansar Dine, comes from the Kidal region. This might be the 
reason why sexual violence did not take place, to protect the women of ‘his’ region, 
or why some women deny the existence of sexual violence in this region. It is also 
possible that the sexual violence indeed didn’t took place, or that it is denied to 
avoid shame of the women of the society.    
     
Discourse of local women     
 It is clear that the women in the North of Mali were victims during the occupation. 
Describing themselves as ‘first victims of the conflict’, they faced beatings, 
oppression and sexual violence. The affecting story of Khadijatou, the young woman 
who was raped in Gaundam, shows us that resistance was very difficult: “They tried 
to do marches, but were scared of the Jihadist. They were armed and the people 
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didn’t have anything to defend themselves. The Jihadists would even sit at the corner 
of the streets and lash guns, even if they didn’t like the way you walked, they would 
beat you up. That’s how they worked.” (Khadijatou, woman from Gaundam, 
interviewed on June 29, 2014). Besides the strict Sharia rules and the violence that 
took place, the characteristics of the Malian society also played part: “Because the 
society is more patriarchal, it’s not easy for women to be heard. They are always 
going to be minimized.” (Mariam, woman from Bamako, interviewed on June 24, 
2014). This idea that women were merely victims, unable to control their 
environment, seems to reveal a structuralist point of view, in which women are 
restricted by social structures of their environment. However, the perspective of 
local women’s organizations, discussed in the next section, offers a very different 
point of view.     
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Local women’s organizations     
     
Aka fó I musso bè sé ila oka hussa aka fó ini musso bè gnongonna dongodo: It's 
better that people say your wife controls you, than that they’re saying you fight 
with your wife every day.     
     
This popular Bambara saying in Mali shows that there is another side to the story: a 
side in which women apparently are able to control their husbands. This suggests a 
stronger position of women in the Malian society, a position in which women can be 
seen as individual agents. During the occupation of 2012, there were many occasions 
in which women of Mali have shown to be actors, capable of influencing their 
environment. This side of the story was often told by women’s organizations.      
As has been said, eleven of the sixteen women I have interviewed were 
member of a women’s organization. Eight of them were in the North during the 
occupation, in the regions of Kidal, Gao and Timbuktu. I noticed a great difference in 
the amount of resistance women were able to offer in the North and in the South of 
Mali. This makes sense, because as has been described, only the North of the country 
was occupied. In the South there were a lot of protests about the occupation, while 
in the North the women protested under the occupation, which is very difficult in an 
environment where repression and violence take place.      
The women of organizations in the North of Mali stated that it was very hard 
for them to resist the repressing measures. A Tuareg woman from Kidal said about 
the possibility to resist during the rule of Jihadist groups: “They couldn’t.  The Jihadist 
forbade women to walk in the streets. When the Jihadist were there, the women 
stayed in the house. It was not allowed to leave the house, they had to be veiled. It 
was not allowed for a man and a woman to be together if they were not married”.      
A woman from Timbuktu also expressed the difficulties to resist. She points at 
an interesting problem that made it more difficult for women to have an influence. “I 
think that all the women who could, left; all the important women left, all the 
important women, like the leaders of the women’s organizations, they all left as soon 
as the jihadist came.” (Kadi, woman from Timbuktu, interviewed on July 2, 2014). She 
herself is an influential woman; the head of a women’s organization in Timbuktu, and 
also closely connected with the union. But she also left as soon as she could during 
the occupation. The women who were forced to stay behind were the less influential 
or powerful women who didn’t have the means to leave. There was one group of 
women who tried to demonstrate and resist the repression of the Jihadists, 
according to the Kadi. These were Bella women, considered a marginalized group. 
Their resistance and demonstration did not have an effect. Other women confirmed 
that the departure of influential women was a major problem in the resistance:   
“Everybody left. Whoever could actually pay their transport or get away in one way 
or the other left. So it was the really marginalized, the poor of the poor, the people 
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who had nothing, who had no choice but to stay, they were the only ones who 
stayed. And of course they were too weak to even… they would just do whatever 
they were told to do. They’re too afraid, they don’t have any power. They’re 
dehumanized in many ways, and so. I think that’s probably the reason, if the stronger 
women; people who had influence, people who could do something, stayed maybe, 
things would have been different. If they had the guts to actually do something” 
(Binette, woman from Bamako, interviewed on June 18, 2014).      
     
Kadi told me that the influential women and leaders of women’s organizations have 
decided that, should the situation repeat itself in the future, they will stay and resist 
the repression. Not all women from the North fled however, and some women claim 
to have made a difference by resisting the occupying groups. Aicha stayed in Gao 
during the occupation. According to her, the jihadists feared the power of the 
women´s organization:      
     
“They (MUJAO) arrested the president of our organization. I personally went to the 
jihadists at the hospital of Gao. I said ‘let go of the president, arrest me instead´. 
MUJAO said ‘no, the people will protest everywhere in Gao if we arrest you´. We did 
a sitting at the hospital. The Jihadists were forced to let go. Another example was 
when the jihadists did not allow people to watch television, we did a protest march. 
The Jihadists said they have never seen this kind of resistance from occupied people. 
The jihadists were scared of the women of the organization; every time they came 
with something, the women refused, they didn’t do it” (Aicha, woman from Gao, 
interviewed on July 5, 2014).     
     
Lamina, a woman from Timbuktu explains why it was hard for women to stay and 
resist. Her story shows that that women were treated differently than men, and 
corresponds with the various scholars mentioned in in the literature section, who 
stated that wartime affect men and women differently.      
     
“On the first day of the occupation MNLA and MAA came into town, but we didn’t 
want to leave. We said we were women; we had a role to play. So I said I stayed to 
see things trough. Three days after, the jihadists started to come in town. The 
Jihadists, they were looking for women leaders. They went to the headquarters of 
the association and they destroyed everything, because a woman was leading that 
association. So they didn’t want any woman leading any organization in the town. 
After that I send my mum to Sebare and me and my kids stayed in the bush in de 
wilderness, 80 kilometers from Bamako. My mum went to my brother’s house. We 
spent 40 days in the wilderness” (Lamina, woman from Timbuktu, interviewed on 
June 20, 2014).     
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‘We will wear the pants, you will wear the skirts’     
As has been described, only the North of the country was occupied. That is why it 
was easier for women in Bamako to play a role during the occupation than it was for 
the women in the North of the country. All women’s organizations in Bamako claim 
that women were very active during the occupation, and played various influential 
roles. The women spoke about networks they started, and plenty of marches and 
sittings they organized to express their discontentedness about the situation and to 
raise awareness about what was happening in the north. Mariam from Bamako 
explains how a march is organized:      
     
“We have a platform. Every day the women leaders meet. That’s where they decide 
on doing a march. When the leaders agreed on one thing, they put in online, saying 
there’s going to be a march, at that time, this day. I don’t know the exact number of 
people who participate in a march, but every organization in the platform brings 
women. Even during march, women going to the market join in. It will be about 200, 
300 people. I myself participate in many marches.” (Mariam, woman from Bamako, 
interviewed on June 24, 2014).      
     
Another common form of demonstration is doing a sitting.      
     
“When the killings were happening in Kidal, that was before the occupation. When 
the Malian army was killed, when that was happening, we did a sitting, we were all in 
white. And we said to the men; ‘if you’re not going to defend our kids and take care 
of us, we will do it ourselves. We will wear the pants, you will wear the skirts. If 
you’re not willing to protect our kids in the north, you’re going to wear the skirts. We 
did it twice, one when ATT was in power, one when Dioncounda was in power. The 
soldiers who died in Agono, they’re our sons, or considered as their sons. We were 
pushing our husbands to push the government for protections. Every event that 
happened, women reacted to it” (Mariam, woman from Bamako, interviewed on 
June 24, 2014).     
     
     
Agency after de Coupe d’état      
On March the 21th of 2012, a coup d’état took place, organized by Amadou Sanago. 
This coup d’état led to several situations in which women’s organizations claim to 
have played important roles and to have exercised influence over the situation.      
First of all, the coup led to a situation of chaos and uncertainty. In this period 
there was a lot of civil pressure towards coup leader Sanogo to return to 
constitutional order. Many women’s organizations have also undertaken actions to 
pressure Sanogo to return to constitutional live. Hawa explains how her organization 
took part in the public pressure. “In Bamako the women formed alliances; they made 
a manifest and gave it to authorities. The manifest was a list of demands; it had to 
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bring back peace, so we handed it to the embassy. It was written by the alliance of 
women, which are different organizations united” (Hawa, woman from Bamako, 
interviewed on June 23, 2014). The goal of the manifest was:      
     
“It helped draw attention to what was happening in the north and security in the 
capital city. At that time there was no security in Bamako. Right after Kidal was 
taken, the coup happened. I personally went to see Sanogo with a couple of women, 
and we gave a copy to Sanago. We called on to Sanogo to return to constitutional 
live for the country, to get the country out of the crisis. On 29 March 2012 we gave a 
copy to Sanogo, and on 30 March we gave him the memorandum; that was like, we 
called on to him to stop what he was doing and to return to constitutional order. 
When gave him manifest, he said that until that day, everybody came to talk about 
their own interest. But this was the first time since he was in power, that people 
came to him to talk about the future of the country as an entity” (Hawa, woman 
from Bamako, interviewed on June 23, 2014).      
     
According to the Hawa, Sanogo had fulfilled one or two of their requests by 
apologizing to the community and to ECOWAS, and returning to constitutional order.  
Mariam is member of a well-known Malian organization for women’s rights, and she 
also claims to have influenced the leader of the coup.      
     
“When the coup d’état happened, we went to see Sanago, and said ‘Thank you for 
the coupe, now we need to get back to constitutional order’. When they returned to 
the constitutional order, you know when Dioncounda Traoré became transitional 
president, we wrote an open letter to the president, and asked him to consider 
women in his new government” (Mariam, woman from Bamako, interviewed on June 
24, 2014). This letter was from a network, Groupe Pivot / Droits et Citoyenneté des 
femmes: this is a network of eight organizations. Their main message was that 
women have done a lot in the crisis, they should not be forgotten and should be 
included in the new government. “It had an effect, but it wasn’t what we wished for. 
When we wrote the letter there were only three women in the government, and we 
wanted more. So we demanded to see the prime minister, and they went to see him, 
and let him know that they were not happy” (Mariam, woman from Bamako, 
interviewed on June 24, 2014).     
     
Her organization also wasn’t happy with the peace negotiations in Ouagadougou, 
Burkina Faso, in which only men took part.      
     
“We formed a platform of women, called ‘Commission dialogue de reconciliation and 
justice’. During a meeting with this platform, we noticed there were no women in 
the negotiations, so we sent out of our own pockets two women to Ouagadougou. 
UN women took care of the expanses for this. The women, they were not going to let 
them participate in the negotiations, because they were not invited. There was some 
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lobbying; but they didn’t sit at the table. They were able to negotiate, it wasn’t easy 
but they get some of the demands through. When they came back home from 
Burkina, they started a sensibilization campaign, to let women know what was in the 
accord. Women said that they were not OK with what was in the accord. Because it 
was not a solution to the problem.” (Mariam, woman from Bamako, interviewed on 
June 24, 2014).      
     
I spoke to one of the women who attended to the negotiations of Ouagadougou. She 
wants to involve women in the peace negotiations:      
     
“I am fighting for that since 1990 ‘till today, but still nothing. I was in Ouaga during 
the negotiations, but I didn’t participate. I was able to give my opinion and that was 
it. I got to talk to some people, but I did not participate. Even if we’re not invited, we 
are going to be there. Right now we are preparing or training women for dialogue 
and the negotiations, to consolidate peace and to analyze the factors of conflict, the 
causes of conflict to be able to see who the real actors in the conflict are and to be 
able to resolve and analyze the conflict and bring solutions for the conflict.” (Fanta, 
woman from Gao).     
     
The Naked March     
Approximately a month after the coup d’état a counter-coup was attempted by 
forces loyal to former president Amadou Toumani Touré. The junta was able to end 
the counter-coup. In the beginning of May 2012, soldiers loyal to Captain Sanogo 
(socalled ‘green berets’) went looking for soldiers suspected to be involved in the 
counter-coup; the soldiers loyal to ATT, (referred to as red berets). In this period, 
more than 40 people were arrested.  I spoke to Tashia, whose brother was a red 
beret and was kidnapped by the green berets. She now is the spokesperson for an 
organization of family members of missing red berets: association des femmes et 
espouses de beret rouge assasinees (association of the wives and relatives of the 
disappeared Red Berets). Tashia says she has been threatened by Sanogo and his 
people, because she had a lot of evidence that they kidnapped and killed the people.     
     
“On that day, my brother came back home from work, somebody called him and said 
he should go to Campara, which is the base of the red berets. Something was 
happening, it was around 4 pm. He went to Campara. Around 7 pm, my other 
brother said he should go out, there was a conflict in the army. ‘Which part of the 
army?’ we asked. He replied that the conflict was between the green berets and the 
red berets. So I tried to call my brother. We went to the neighbors; they tried to get 
the number of someone else to talk to him. Before assemble, alert was given to 
everybody on the red beret side. There was a guy I talked to. He said he was inside 
his house; everybody was hiding. I couldn’t reach my brother, and the next morning I 
also didn’t get an answer. So I went to the hospital to see if he was wounded. When I 
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was at the hospital, I heard that the green berets took the wounded to Cafi.  I came 
back to Campara, and got a list of 11 people who died. But my brother was not on 
the list. On the same day, I went to Cafi to see if he was among the prisoners, but 
they wouldn’t let me. I even went to the police office, but they tried to beat me up. I 
ran away, and the guy threw his club at me.  Someone took me to colonel Samake, 
and he showed me three lists; a list of people who died, a list of prisoners and a list 
of the wounded. My brother’s name was not on the lists, not on any of those. From 
that day on, I did not receive any news. Not of any of the red berets, until the 
elections” (Tashia, woman from Bamako, interviewed on June 25, 2014).     
     
Sagara, the president of the organization says they told the Minister of Defense that 
they would do a naked march if they didn’t tell them what happened to their family 
members. She also shared this with Amnesty International: “We told the Minister of 
Defense that we would march naked into the mosques if he did not tell us what has 
happened to our loved ones. We gave them a deadline of the arrival of the Amnesty 
International delegation [at the end of November]. He told us to be patient and that 
they were doing what they can. The very next day Sanogo was arrested and 
charged
12
.”      
A naked march is a great shame to society. There is a strong believe in Mali 
that when it comes to the point that women in society take off their clothes and start 
marching the streets, whoever is in power will lose power or get arrested. The 
general idea is that one does not deserve to be in power when it comes to a naked 
march. It didn’t come to an actual naked march in Bamako. Just the threat of a naked 
march is a strong tool for women to pressure political decisions.      
     
Tashia: “On that day, I received a phone call of a high person, asking them to meet 
with the minister of defense. When they went there to meet, he told them to stop 
the manifest, and everything they were doing, because they said they were going to 
stop Sanogo. The next day, 27
th
 of November 2013, he was arrested. One week after 
he was arrested, the judge ordered that the army should investigate what happened 
to the red berets” (Tashia, woman from Bamako, interviewed on June 25, 2014).      
     
At the time of the interview, Tashia’s brother was still missing. She showed me some 
video clips on her phone, in which red berets were showed undressed and tied up. 
The man holding the camera is saying things to them like ‘Lift your head up so I can 
see your face’. These type of clips were shown to family members of the kidnapped 
soldiers, to receive payment for their release. According to Tashia, a family paid for 
the video to get the soldiers released, but the green berets didn’t release them. A 
mass grave with 21 bodies was discovered on 31 December in Diago, near a military 
base. “After the discovery of the mass grave, life became worse for the members of 
our organization. The mother of one of the red berets is paralyzed now, when she 
                                                      
12
 https://www.amnesty.org/en/articles/news/2013/12/mali-must-urgently-identify-bodiesfoundmassgrave/     
53     
     
heard the news of the mass grave. My mum and dad are in physical shock, they don’t 
know what they are doing” (Tashia, woman from Bamako, interviewed on June 25, 
2014). Several weeks after the interview, Tashia brought me the news that the 
bodies were identified and they were planning on having a communal funeral.     
     
Discourse of local women’s organizations     
It is clear that the women in the occupied North faced much more difficulties to offer 
resistance against the oppression than the women in Bamako. Some women stated 
that the women with power and money fled to the South, leaving the poor and 
marginalized women such as the Bella behind in the occupied North. It is also clear 
that the women were affected in a different way than the men; even though men 
were also living under the sharia law and were often victim of violence, women were 
more often victim of sexual violence and appeared to be more restricted in their 
freedom; they were forced to cover themselves up and abandon their economic 
activities.  These difficulties lead to the question: how much agency is left when 
there is a violent occupation? The stories of the women reveal that even though the 
circumstances were very hard, some women were still able to protest, influence and 
live their lives in a way they wanted to.    
Not all the influential women in the North left. Women like Aicha in Gao 
stayed behind and organized marches and sittings to influence the jihadists. Fanta in 
Gao went to the peace negotiations to let her opinion be heard. Tashia from Bamako 
defends the interests of the family members of the missing soldiers. And many, many 
women in Bamako participated in marches and sittings to influence the public and 
political debate. These women show that women are not merely victims, but 
influential actors, taking matters in own hands when they feel that something needs 
to be done. Even though women in the North of the country were more restricted in 
their actions than women in the South, the discourse of these women’s organizations 
can only be described as an image of powerful, strong women, exercising agency and 
trying to influence their environment. I’ve often talked about this with an 
independent researcher from Bamako, Fatoumata Keita. After months of research, 
she is convinced of the strong resistance that women offered during the occupation.     
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Independent researcher     
     
Intifada in the North     
     
During my stay in Bamako, I had plenty of discussions with an independent 
researcher who strongly believes in the position of women as agents, Fatoumata 
Keita, author of the book ‘Crise Sécuritaire et violences au Nord du Mali’ (2014). The 
first thing she told me was that she started her research with the approach based on 
gender-based violence on women. But then she found out that men were affected 
by violence as well. Therefore she studied the cases of women, but included cases of 
men in her study as well. Fatoumata Keita emphasizes the amount of resistance that 
occurred during the occupation. She categorizes three types of resistance in the 
North: two great revolutions in the North, resistance of young girls and the refusal to 
leave.     
     
The two great revolutions in the North     
Fatoumata Keita describes the first category of resistance in the North as two 
revolutions. The first revolution is called ‘Intifada of Timbuktu’. Intifada is an Arabic 
word that has more than one meaning. Literally translated, it means "shaking off." 
Less literally, but more often applied, is the word's other meaning: uprising or 
rebellion
13
. She states that in Timbuktu the women formed a group to confront the 
jihadists, starting a revolution. The women of Timbuktu lived under Sharia law; they 
were forced to cover up when they were on the street. But the women were chased 
by the jihadists even inside their house, according to Keita. The women couldn’t 
accept the jihadists entering their houses to arrest them, and decided to put a stop 
to this. “So the women of Timbuktu went and confronted the jihadists about that, 
they said: ‘you jihadists came to our city, occupying our city, but it’s our city. You run 
after people till you’re in our house, and when you’re in our house, you keep chasing 
us. That’s violating our intimacy, our property’”. This female front made an impact: 
“The jihadists changed the rule and said; nobody is allowed to chase people inside 
their houses. Even if they’re not covered up, and you run in your house, they have to 
stop. And if you run inside a house after somebody, and you’re killed, than that’s 
your problem, we are not responsible anymore. We’re not going to do anything 
about it” (Fatoumata Keita, researcher from Bamako, interviewed on June 26, 2014).     
Fatoumata Keita is emphasizing the amount of courage the women of 
Timbuktu had: “The day they confronted the jihadists, the jihadists shot in the air to 
scare the women. The women fell down, waited ‘till the guns stopped. When they 
stopped shooting, the women got up and went to confront the jihadists. The women 
said to their husbands; if you are not able to come out and defend our rights, we will 
go out and defend ourselves. If they are going to kill us, let them kill us all, but we are 
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going to say what we need to say” (Fatoumata Keita, researcher from Bamako, 
interviewed on June 26, 2014).     
The second revolution in the North took place in Gao, and was organized by 
the young people of the area. The young people of Gao formed three groups: the 
first group patrolled in the streets, they were protecting people from kidnappings 
and robberies in the city of Gao. They were mainly against MNLA. There was a 
second group called ‘Young Patriots’: they took the Malian flag, and put it 
everywhere the Islamist flag was. The third group was called ‘Cadre des Jeunes’. That 
group had members of the other two groups, and the group had members of not 
only young people, but also women and men. Fatoumata Keita says that also in Gao 
changes were being made thanks to the resisting groups:      
     
“There was a store in Gao. Kids would go there and play on the PlayStation. The 
Jihadist came in and broke everything in the store. When that happened the young 
people in Gao manifested. There was a big march about it. The leader of the first 
group, the young patrollers was Moussa Touré. He went to see coordinator of the 
Jihadists in the city, named Abdul Karim and said; you came in the city, you told us 
your rules, but you didn’t say anything about play stations. Now your soldiers came 
and broke the games of one of our brothers. Abdul Karim said he didn’t want to have 
any problems with the young people of Gao. He told him to go back to his brother 
and the make a list of everything that was broken. The jihadists paid back 130.000 
CFA (around 200 euros) for reparations” (Fatoumata Keita, researcher from Bamako, 
interviewed on June 26, 2014).     
     
Resistance of young girls     
The second category Fatoumata Keita distinguishes is resistance of the young girls in 
Gao. These girls refused to stay inside their houses and let the jihadists control their 
lives. So they covered themselves up, but they were basically challenging the 
jihadists:      
     
“They said to the jihadists: ‘you told us to cover up, and we are covered up. But we 
are not going to stay inside, we are going to go out and walk around if we want’. The 
girls said: ‘the problem is not what we wear; the problem is with you people. 
Because you are the ones who have sexual needs. And covering up is just an excuse 
for you to take us to prison and rape us. Now we are covered up, you don’t have 
reason to arrest anybody. So you don’t have any reason to take us to prison 
anymore. We are covered up, we are not going to stay inside, but we are going to go 
out and you are going to see us. You are going to have to cross your legs and do 
nothing about it” (Fatoumata Keita, researcher from Bamako, interviewed on June 
26, 2014).     
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The jihadists told the population that if the girls would be covered up, nothing 
was going to happen to them. By playing by their rules, the girls were able to live 
their lives without being raped by the jihadists. “And the girls of the city, when they 
passed the jihadist’s, they could see the sexual desire on their faces. The girls said 
that they could see that the jihadists were just waiting for one of them to break the 
rules, and take them to prison and rape them. So the girls didn’t give them the 
chance to do that” (Fatoumata Keita, researcher from Bamako, interviewed on June 
26, 2014).     
     
Refusing to leave     
The final category of resistance that Fatoumata identifies is the refusal of the women 
to leave Gao. “They said; we’re going to stay here and see what’s going to happen. 
This is our land, this is our house, and this is our life. We are not going to leave it for 
anything. If something happens, it’s going to happen. Even though they were 
violated at some point, they didn’t leave. They were rough, they didn’t leave, so they 
stayed in Gao” (Fatoumata Keita, researcher from Bamako, interviewed on June 26, 
2014). The women who decided to stay, didn’t just stay, but they were involved in 
the movements and the marches that were going on in Gao. One woman told 
Fatoumata that she used to go out and just sit by the door, and watch what was 
happening. She said that it was like a movie what was happening to them. She 
couldn’t believe it, so she had to stay, and see what was happening. She had to see 
the end of the movie.     
     
Discourse of independent researcher Fatoumata Keita     
It is clear that Fatoumata Keita sees women as powerful agents. She emphasizes the 
amount of resistance of the women in the North, and frames the results of the 
events from an agency-perspective. The fact that the women decided to stay and live 
their lives, despite of the occupation, is interpreted as an act of resistance. Also, for 
Keita it is not the effectiveness and the influence of the resistance that counts, it is 
the act of resistance itself: “At least women showed they were not going to sit by 
and see what happened. It is not the effectiveness that counts, but the fact that 
women stood up” (Fatoumata Keita, researcher from Bamako, interviewed on June  
26, 2014).     
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MNLA and Jihadist groups     
Several groups occupied the North in 2012; there were the Tuareg rebel groups  
Mouvement National pour la liberation de l´Azawad (MNLA) and Mouvement arabe 
de l’Azawad (MAA), and there were many Jihadists groups, such as Al-Qaeda in the 
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Ansar Dine and Mouvement pour l'Unicité et le Jihad en 
Afrique de l'Ouest (MUJAO). I did not have an opportunity to actually speak with 
members of the occupying groups, but it is very interesting and revealing to look at 
the way in which the different actors perceived these groups. Before looking at these 
perspectives, it is necessary to note that few of the informants actually distinguished 
between the groups. “We think that MNLA and the Jihadists are the same people. 
One opened the door to the other to get in, so… they are collaborators, they work 
together. There is no difference between them” (Fatoumata Keita, researcher from 
Bamako, interviewed on June 26, 2014). Another informant claimed, after I stated 
that these groups seem to have different objectives:      
     
“That’s the thing, that’s what they say. But when it comes to fighting the Malian 
army, the government, they’re together. So they have these disagreements 
sometimes, but then they are seen as a united force. So that’s why it is very tricky. 
They do what works for them, so if it works for them to say, oh no we don’t want the 
division of the territory, we just want Sharia, ok, so let’s go with the Sharia, oh no no, 
we don’t want the sharia law, we want to be an independent state. It’s like, […] my 
own analysis of the thing is that they do things as they see fit. Because at the end of 
the day, these people are not after anything but money. It’s economic, it’s very much 
economic.” (Binette, woman from Bamako, interviewed on June 18, 2014).     
     
The MNLA first entered the cities, but the cities were later taken over by the jihadist 
groups. Both of the groups were violent, but in a different way. Even though the 
jihadists are seen as the major threat by international actors, the MNLA appears to 
be much more hated by the Malian population. “The MNLA is the start of the 
problems, to the Malian people the MNLA is much worse than the Jihadists” 
(Khadijatou, woman from Gaundam, interviewed on June 29, 2014).      
Analyzing the stories, I believe there are several reasons for this antipathy 
against the MNLA. The first reason has to do with the fact that the MNLA is a direct 
threat to the sovereignty of the Malian state, while the Malian people want Mali to 
remain united: “I don’t recognize Azawad as a country. Mali is one, the North is part 
of Mali. The Tuareg are Malian before everything” (Khadijatou, woman from 
Gaundam, interviewed on June 29, 2014). Secondly, there is a generally tiredness of 
the rebellions in the North, which occur again and again. “The people from Kidal, and 
especially the people of the MNLA receive the most help. Every other part of Mali is 
poor. If a region in the South organized everybody and said: ‘we want independence, 
because this is a poor country’, we will be divided in more than two parts. The 
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government has helped Kidal more than any other part of the country. Every time 
there are problems with the movement, the government negotiates with them, and 
gives them money. Every time there are problems, they will get money. But when 
the money is finished, the problems will start again” (Khadijatou, woman from 
Gaundam, interviewed on June 29, 2014). The third reason that the Malian 
population do not like the MNLA, is the extreme violence that took place during the 
occupation.    
     
“[A]t first, the population liked the jihadists in a way. When the MNLA came into 
Gao, they came and broke everything, they went to every administration building 
and broke everything. And they went to every house, and if a family has one car, 
they’re going to take it, so they took every car and every house. The MNLA was 
robbing people, breaking everything in Gao.  When Jihadists came into town, they 
put a stop to all excesses of the MNLA. That’s the reason the population of Gao was 
behind the jihadist because they protected them from MNLA at first. That was before 
they saw their true face” (Fatoumata Keita, researcher from Bamako, interviewed on 
June 26, 2014).      
   
According to some, they even established a form of slavery; “The MNLA was the first 
to start raping. When MNLA came, they minimalized people with darker skin: people 
from MNLA are the one who own them now, the dark skinned are the ones owned 
by the MNLA, their slaves” (Lamina, woman from Timbuktu, interviewed on June 20, 
2014).     
     
Unlike the situation in Gao, in Timbuktu the jihadists as well as the MNLA were seen 
as intruders from the moment they entered the city. A woman from Timbuktu 
explains why they didn’t like the jihadists from the start:      
     
“We didn’t like the jihadists. I can only talk about Timbuktu. There is no region more 
Muslim, more Islamic than Timbuktu. And what the jihadist came to Timbuktu to 
teach? There is nothing the jihadists can teach us in Timbuktu, we know almost 
everything about Islam already.  We didn’t like the jihadist coming to Timbuktu 
because we saw what they could do.” (Lamina, woman from Timbuktu, interviewed 
on June 20, 2014).     
     
Women in the occupying groups     
During my stay in Bamako, I tried to find out what roles women had in the MNLA and 
Jihadist groups. I received many different answers from the different actors involved 
in the conflict, and probably all of them have some truth to them. The Tuareg 
women I spoke with claimed that women have very important roles in the MNLA. 
“There are some female leaders, some of them are powerful, even more powerful 
than men. You can also see that in the history.” (Kadidia, woman from Kidal, 
interviewed July 1, 2014). However, the reason why these women are not visible is in 
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the culture, according to these women: “In meetings, in public, women withdraw, 
that’s the outside. But at home, on the inside, the man consults the wife. It is the 
wife who decides what to do. The woman is the counselor of the man” (Djenebou, 
woman from Kidal, interviewed July 1, 2014). Many other women also think MNLA 
have female leaders: “Some are leaders. They lead others and train the others, the 
young” (Mariam, woman from Bamako, interviewed on June 24, 2014). A woman 
from a women´s organization in Bamako:      
     
“Women are active inside MNLA. The proclaimed government of MNLA, Azawad, two 
women are part of it. There are women who fight along MNLA who really combat. 
They take arms and fight. We wanted to meet the women of the MNLA and talk to 
them and ask them why they were fighting alongside the MNLA. But when the 
problems in Kidal started in April we couldn’t talk” (Hawa, woman from Bamako, 
interviewed on June 23, 2014).      
     
One situation that occurred during an interview I had with a woman from an 
international NGO, shows that women can play active roles in movements such as 
the MNLA. During the interview, a moment of panic occurred, because the woman I 
interviewed heard that one of her colleagues was killed. It turned out that this 
colleague, who came from Kidal, secretly had a boyfriend in the MNLA, who was 
imprisoned in Bamako. The man escaped from prison, and they tried to flee 
together, but both of them were killed during the attempt. The employees of the 
NGO were shocked, because it seemed that their college; the woman from Kidal, has 
had twofold interests and that she had been playing a double role in the NGO. This 
event shows that women are apparently able to function as some kind of double 
agent in an international organization, secretly loyal to the MNLA.      
However, other women were not so sure about the role of women in MNLA. 
A woman from Timbuktu stated that not the MNLA, but the jihadists brought their 
women with them: “They came with their families and came with their women. The 
women didn’t play any role in the Jihad, they were there as families. Some were even 
breastfeeding, some were cooking, but they didn’t play an active role in the process 
of the conquerence. I didn’t see any women active in MNLA, only the women of the 
Jihadists came with their children, and they were just supporting” (Kadi, woman from 
Timbuktu, interviewed on July 2, 2014).      
     
Another woman from Timbuktu referred to the hostility between women from 
different areas:      
     
“I don’t know if there are women active inside MNLA. But I know of women who are 
supportive of MNLA. Even now, women from Gao and Kidal cannot sit at the same 
table. If women from Kidal start talking they will insult the women from Gao, and 
vice versa. They will insult each other. Even now the women who stayed in Kidal, 
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who are now in Kidal, they are supportive of the MNLA. They say ‘we’re going to die 
for the MNLA’, they have the flags of the MNLA. Certainly they are pushed by their 
husbands. But the women who don’t like the MNLA, they are here, they left” 
(Lamina, woman from Timbuktu, interviewed on June 20, 2014).      
     
Discourses about occupying groups     
It is interesting that few people distinguished between the MNLA and Jihadists 
groups. This has to do with the collaborations in the beginning of the occupation 
between these groups, and the fact that sometimes members switch between them. 
None of the informants thought women were active in jihadists groups. But many of 
the women thought women were active and even leaders in the MNLA, especially 
the Touareg women from Kidal I interviewed. The MNLA is reinforcing this image of 
women in the MNLA with propaganda, such as pamphlets about Azawad with 
pictures of beautiful women, such as seen in figure 1 below. Many of the women 
referred to a female former politician, who has joined the MNLA, called Nina Walet 
Intalou. Even though many women and especially women from the AZAWAD areas 
believe women are quite active inside the movement, the employees of MINUSMA 
I´ve spoken to, didn´t believe these women in the MNLA actually had any power: 
they stated that the women were probably used as token women to get 
international support for their movement. The differences in the way women in the 
occupying groups are perceived, reveal interesting underlying interests: The MNLA 
members want to gain as much international support as possible to meet their goals, 
which explains the propaganda they are using. The Malian women want to show the 
outside world their strength and influence, while the MINUSMA employees are 
perceiving the situation from their Western point of view, which might partly be 
based on prejudices about the amount of influence Malian women are able to have.  
 
     
Figure 1: pamphlet MNLA, source: http://www.memri.org/report/en/print6548.htm      
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Conclusion and discussion     
In this thesis, I have focused on the perspectives that various actors involved in the 
Malian conflict have about the role of gender, women and the conflict of 2012, and 
what these discourses tell us about the effectiveness of the gender policies of 
MINUSMA. I have done this by analyzing the various discourses from an 
agency/structure point of view.      
It is clear that gender and conflict are very interrelated. The initial debate about 
gender and conflict was dominated by the persistent believe in the universal image 
of men as warriors and women as peacekeepers. Even though most scholars have 
abandoned this stereotypical view, it is clear that in masculine organizations such as 
the military, stereotypical views such as these still exist. Civilians are often victim of 
violence in a conflict. Men and women are affected in a different way; where men 
are more often forced to join the fighting forces, women are more often affected by 
(sexual) violence. Some scholars (Nagel 2003; Brownmiller 1975) state that wars are 
in fact fought on bodies of women; rape is often used as a weapon of war to 
humiliate the enemy and disrupt a society. Even though rape is very common during 
war, women are not always in the position of victim; many scholars have shown that 
women can be influential actors during warfare, and often take on combat roles in a 
conflict. Female combatants have been active in many countries, for example 
Algeria, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, 
South Africa, Sri Lanka, and Zimbabwe (Bouta, Frerks & Bannon 2004:11).      
Looking at the case of Mali, it is clear that there are many actors involved in this 
conflict. I have distinguished seven: the UN, the Dutch government, the soldiers on 
the ground, local women, local women’s organizations, an independent researcher, 
and the occupying groups. For a project or mission to function effectively, 
communication between the different actors or stakeholders is necessary 
(Alexandra-Mihaela & Danut 2013; Turner 2014). MINUSMA has very ambitious 
gender policies, referring to gender as a priority. However, there seems to be a 
discrepancy between the ambitious gender policies and the actual implementation 
of them. To find out what this discrepancy is, I have analyzed the discourses of these 
various actors involved in the Malian conflict, and approached this from an 
agency/structure perspective. The structure/agency debate revolves around the 
question to what extent individuals are able to act independently and shape their 
own social world. Agency is associated with choice, reflexivity, transformative 
capacity, and learning, while the structuralist point of view is based on social or 
material structures that heavily influence individuals (O’Neill, Balsiger and 
VanDeveer, 2004:151). The different actors involved in the conflict all had various 
stories to tell, and various perspectives on women in conflict.      
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Discourses    
The United Nations seem to have a high commitment towards integrating gender 
into peace missions. This perspective is also emphasized in MINUSMA, often referred 
to as a ‘gender-focused mission’. Looking at the MINUSMA mandate, women are 
mentioned eight times in the eleven-paged Resolution. Six times however, they are 
mentioned in a victimized way, in the context of violence and protection. On the 
other hand, the necessity of involving women in the processes of stabilization and 
peacebuilding is also emphasized. However, the importance of including women is 
not elaborated on, which implies a stereotypical view about the ‘peaceful nature’ of 
women. In the policies and resolutions of the United Nations, a balance between 
women as victims and women as agents is trying to be found. The contribution of the 
Netherlands to MINUSMA is mainly focused on the gathering and processing of 
intelligence. Even though MINUSMA is often described as a ‘gender-focused’ 
mission, it seems that the reality differs from the policies and mandate on paper. 
Many soldiers I’ve spoken to did not receive a gender-specific training, and those 
who did received a superficial training of about 20 minutes. Even though the gender 
focused training is extended with a one day course at the ministry of foreign affairs, 
one can question whether this is enough to call gender a ‘priority’ in MINUSMA. The 
result of this lack of gender-training is that many soldiers don’t see gender as an 
important subject which can increase the effectiveness of the mission, but rather 
feel like the subject is imposed by politicians. The comparison with Afghanistan is 
easily made, and it is clear that many soldiers perceive Malian women in a victimized 
and stereotypical way.    
The local women from the North explained the difficulties they had to face 
during the occupation. Without denying that men were suffering from violence as 
well, there was a lot of gender-based violence affecting the women during the 
occupation. Richters (2001) explains various forms of gender based violence; this 
does not only include physical injury, but also sexual and psychological abuse. She 
adds economical violence as a fourth form; forcing women out of their houses, 
economically disempowerment, preventing a women from working (Richters 
2001:139-140). Analyzing the stories of the women from the North, one can 
conclude that all of these forms of gender based violence occurred during the 
occupation. Many of the women were raped, there were forced marriages, they 
were forced to cover themselves up, they were not allowed to be with a man other 
than their husband, they were forced to abandon their economic activities, and they 
were violently punished with beatings or lashes when they didn’t follow the rules or 
protested. The violence, oppression and rapes had a physical as well as psychological 
impact on the women. These stories seem to focus on women from a structuralist 
point of view; their freedom was very restricted, and they were often victim of 
violence and repression. Important here is to keep in mind in what context the 
stories take place. Women from different regions share different stories and 
experiences. An example of this is how the society treats victims of sexual violence; 
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in Timbuctu it seems to be more difficult for women to come forward than it is for 
women in Gao. Also, there is a great difference in the experience between women 
from the North and women from the South of the country, since the women in the 
North were faced with a violent occupation. The women in the North emphasized 
the difficulties they faced, which led to an overall structuralist point of view of 
women in the North. The women in the South had more freedom to move and to 
protest against the occupation, offering a stronger point of view about their position.    
Next to the stories of individual women, the women’s organizations and the 
independent researcher offered a very strong image about the position of women 
during the occupation. In the North as well as in the Southern part of Mali, women’s 
organization organized sittings, marches and manifestations to create awareness and 
express their discontentedness about the situation. The independent researcher 
even calls this the ‘Revolutions of the North’. The women also helped the women 
from the North by sending food to people in the North and giving shelter to women 
who fled to Bamako. There were certain moments when women’s organization 
claimed to have really made a difference in the conflict: first of all, they have 
pressured Sanogo to return to the constitutional order. Various women’s 
organizations have shown me the letters they wrote him, the manifest with their 
demands they created and told me about their personal visits to him, to tell them 
their ideas about the future of the countries. Many organizations stated that they 
were the one who convinced Sanogo to return to constitutional life. Even though it is 
very clear that every organization would like to take credit for this, it is fair to say 
that the combined pressure of the numerous women’s organizations, as well as the 
pressure coming from NGO’s, politicians and religious leaders, have led to the return 
to constitutional life. Another event in which women clearly stood up was during the 
peace negotiations in Burkina Faso. No women were invited to take part in the 
negotiations. A platform of women send two representatives to Burkina, to let their 
perspective be heard. They were not able to take part in the official negotiations, but 
they have read a statement during the meetings and let their voices be heard. A third 
occasion in which women have said to have influenced the situation, was after the 
kidnappings of the red beret soldiers by the green beret supporters of Sanogo. 
Months after these events, it still wasn’t clear what exactly happened to these 
soldiers, and Sanogo refused to cooperate with the investigations. The president of 
the ‘Organization of family members of missing soldiers’ threatened to do a naked 
march if the investigation wouldn’t progress. The day after this threat, Sanogo was 
arrested. Notable is the difference between the stories of individual women and the 
stories of women’s organizations; women’s organizations tend to have a more 
optimistic view of the amount of influence they were able to have. Here also it is 
important to take the context and loyalties into account; it is possible that the 
organizations have the tendency to take credit, to present their organization in a 
positive way. It is also very well possible that women are able to achieve more results 
when they join forces and organize themselves in such organizations.    
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   What is also interesting in all of these stories of oppression and resistance, is the 
role of the female body. During the oppression, the women’s bodies were attacked, 
raped, forced to be covered up. During the resistance, female bodies transformed 
into political tools by taking part in sittings and marches. The most interesting 
example of the body as a powerful tool is the threat of the naked march. In a strange 
contrast with the nakedness of the bodies that were oppressed and raped, by 
threatening to undress the female body, without even actually undressing it, a strong 
political pressure tool was created, able to influence political decisions such as the 
arrest of the coupe leader.    
         
Comparison    
Analyzing these different discourses, it is clear that the stories of the different actors 
are disconnected. Interestingly, the United Nations as well as the Dutch government 
emphasize the necessity to include women in the mission. On paper the women are 
indeed presented in a victimized way, but the necessity of involving them in peace 
and decision-making processes is also often mentioned. Nonetheless, it is clear that 
the promising and ambitious policies on paper are not fully implemented in practice. 
The so-called boots on the ground however, offer a very different view on the 
capabilities of women. The necessity of including women in the decision-making and 
peace processes are not always understood, and women are often perceived in a 
stereotypical way, without the believe that women are able to have a meaningful 
contribution to these processes. In comparison with the discourses of the women 
themselves, a great difference in world view is presented; on the one hand individual 
women, especially from the North, often emphasize their suffering and the 
oppression they faced, seeking recognition for their suffering. On the other hand, 
often the image of women as strong actors is presented.  Especially women’s 
organizations felt the need to talk about the influence they exercised, for example 
the role they played in returning to the constitutional order after de coupe d’état. 
The women I spoke to all felt like they had an important role to play, and felt like 
they should be represented in the peace negotiations.    
It seems like the differences in perception between local women and the 
boots on the ground are based on different aspects: first there is the gender aspect, 
in which men are seen as legitimate actors at the negotiation table, and women are 
‘naturally’ being excluded. Secondly, there are cultural stereotypes; the justification 
of excluding women is based on cultural differences in which the women are 
perceived to be solely active inside the house, without the possibilities for them to 
have meaningful accomplishments outside of the household. Finally, there is a 
religious aspect to it, in which Islamic societies are perceived to be not as evolved as 
Western societies. It’s not fair to say that all soldiers have these type of prejudices, 
but these are sounds that are often heard. In short, we see that women want to be 
seen as actors, soldiers who see them as passive victims, and institutions who have 
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great policies on paper, but fail to implement them in practice. Only a better gender-
focused training for the soldiers, and policies that are adjusted to local conditions 
can bring the different world views closer together.    
The discourses of these actors appear to be divided, which tells us the policies 
are not adjusted to local circumstances, and are not able to be effectively 
implemented. All this reveals a lack of effective communication between the 
different actors involved. Several results demonstrate this lack of communication: 
The UN and the Dutch government have in fact partly adopted the modern discourse 
of women as independent agents. However, due to a lack of gender focused training, 
this is not communicated to the soldiers on the ground, the ones that actually need 
to execute the policies. The soldiers on the ground still have a victimizing image of 
women, a strong structuralist point of view. Another case I found in which 
communication is clearly missing, is the fact that employees of MINUSMA as well as 
employees of the ministry of defense claim that the local women will talk to the 
soldiers of MINUSMA, while the women I’ve interviewed deny this persistently: 
“They might speak to the men, but it’s not going to be intimate information. It’s 
going to be what everybody knows. Our traditions and cultures don’t allow us to 
talk” (Marhianna, woman from Bamako, interviewed on June 26, 2014). This reveals 
a malfunction in the communication, which might lead to a lack of local information, 
which might lead to an incomplete analysis of the situation which can result in 
ineffective decisions. Therefore it is necessary to involve all actors, especially the 
local women into the creation as well as the implementation of the policies.       
Analyzing the various discourses from an agency/structure point of view it is clear 
that the perception of women as solely passive victims are unjust, considering the 
powerful roles they played during the occupation. Even though women were often 
victims, they have shown to be able to react to the events, to be able to influence 
their environment, and to let their voices be heard. I would like to end with a 
powerful and passionate plea by a woman from Bamako, which captured the very 
essence of this thesis:     
“But at the end of the day, I hope your analysis, your thesis will show that Malian 
women are really not just mere victims, they’re agents of change. They are part of 
the problem, they’re part of the solution. They were the trigger people, they were 
the trigger point which led to the coup because of their big massive demonstration. 
So if they’re so powerful, in such ways, then they could change a nation. And if they 
can change a nation, than they’re not mere victims, they’re not just passive citizens; 
they’re really big strong powerful human beings. And for me, that would be the 
conclusion” (Binette, woman from Bamako, interviewed on June 18, 2014).     
     
Fortunately, most actors involved in MINUSMA have adopted this agency 
perspective, and see women as individual and powerful actors. However, only with a 
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better communication between all actors involved, effective implementation of 
gender policies can be achieved.      
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Appendix 1: List of informants     
     
Fieldwork in Mali, conducted from 16-06-2014 to 06-07-2014     
To ensure the privacy of the informants, the names the informants are changed, with 
the exception of public figures.     
     
Name     Date     City     Information     
Maria     17-06-2014     Bamako     
Employee of the     
Dutch embassy     
Binette     
     
18-06-2014     Bamako     
Employee    of  an 
international NGO     
Lamina     20-06-2014     Timbuktu     
Member of the     
Association de la     
Paix National Unite     
Aissata     20-06-2014     Timbuktu     
Employee    of    a 
pharmacy     
Bintou     23-06-2014     Bamako     
Teacher  the     
University of     
Bamako     
Hawa     23-06-2014     Bamako     Member of WILDAF     
Mariam     24-06-2014     Bamako     Member of APDF     
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Funta     25-06-2014     Gao     
Member of     
Committee     
Reflexion sur Paix     
Tashia     25-06-2014     Bamako     
Member of     
Association   des 
Femmes et Espouses 
de Beret Rouge     
Assasinees     
Marhianna     
     
26-06-2014     Bamako     Member of CAFO     
Fatoumata Keita     26-06-2014     Bamako     Social Researcher     
Lieutenant XXXX     27-06-2014     Holland/Bamako     
Employee of     
MINUSMA     
Khadijatou     29-06-2014     Gaundam          
Kadidia     01-07-2014     Kidal     
Member of Collectif 
des Femmes de la  
Region de Kidal     
Djenebou     01-07--2014     Kidal     
Member of Collectif 
des Femmes de la     
Rgion de Kidal     
Moussa     02-07-2014     Bamako     Journalist     
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Kadi     02-07-2014     Timbuktu     
Represents the     
Union     
Moussa Mara     03-07-2014     Bamako     
Prime-Minister of     
Mali     
Aicha     05-07-2014     Gao     
Member of     
Association Femmes   
Liberate Gao     
Cheick     6-07-2014     Bamako     Translator     
     
Albakaye Ousmane   
Kounta     
6-07-2014     
  
Bamako     Writer, poet     
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Fieldwork in The Hague, conducted in 2014     
To ensure the privacy of the informants, no detailed list of the informants from The 
Hague is provided. During the fieldwork in The Hague the gender advisor of the 
Ministry of Defense, the gender advisor of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as 
soldiers of various positions, varying from chaplains to employees of communication 
and policy departments, were interviewed.     
     
